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ABSTRACT
How stocks are traded in the United States has been totally
transformed. Gone are the dealers on NASDAQ and the specialists at
the NYSE. Instead, a company’s stock can now be traded on up to
sixty competing venues where a computer matches incoming orders.
High-frequency traders (HFTs) post the majority of quotes and are
the preponderant source of liquidity in the new market.
Many practices associated with the new stock market are highly
controversial, as illustrated by the public furor following the
publication of Michael Lewis’s book Flash Boys. Critics say that
HFTs use their speed in discovering changes in the market and in
altering their orders to take advantage of other traders. Dark pools—
off-exchange trading venues that promise to keep the orders sent to
them secret and to restrict the parties allowed to trade—are accused of
operating in ways that injure many traders. Brokers are said to
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mishandle customer orders in an effort to maximize the payments
they receive for sending trading venues their customers’ orders, rather
than delivering best execution.
In this Article, we set out a simple, but powerful, conceptual
framework for analyzing the new stock market. The framework is
built upon three basic concepts: adverse selection, the principal-agent
problem, and a multivenue trading system. We illustrate the utility of
this framework by analyzing the new market’s eight most
controversial practices. The effects of each practice are evaluated in
terms of the multiple social goals served by equity-trading markets.
We ultimately conclude that there is no emergency requiring
immediate, poorly considered action. Some reforms proposed by
critics, however, are clearly desirable. Other proposed reforms
involve a trade-off between two or more valuable social goals. In
these cases, whether a reform is desirable may be unclear, but a better
understanding of the trade-off involved enables a more informed
choice and suggests areas in which further empirical research would
be useful. Finally, still other proposed reforms are based on
misunderstandings of the market or of the social impacts of a practice
and should be avoided.
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INTRODUCTION
“The United States stock market, the most iconic market in
1
global capitalism, is rigged.” With this provocative statement on 60
Minutes, Michael Lewis, best-selling author of Flash Boys: A Wall
2
Street Revolt, brought to the forefront of public consciousness a
growing controversy concerning the way stocks are traded in the
United States. Such trading has been totally transformed over the last
twenty years. A truly new stock market has developed and not
everyone is pleased with the results. This Article addresses these
dissatisfactions and, in doing so, develops a framework for analyzing
more generally the wide variety of policy issues to which the new
stock market has given rise.
The various actors whose interactions make up the new stock
market have come in for tremendous scrutiny. Particularly sharp
criticism has been aimed at high-frequency traders (HFTs), which are
said to use their speed in finding out changes in the market and in
altering their own orders to take advantage of other traders in the
3
market. HFTs are believed now to participate in about half of all

1. 60 Minutes: Rigged (CBS television broadcast Mar. 30, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/is-the-us-stock-market-rigged [http://perma.cc/7HEF-GXRM].
2. MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014).
3. Charles Schwab, founder of the well-known brokerage firm bearing his name, recently
suggested, for example, that “[h]igh-frequency traders are gaming the system, reaping billions in
the process and undermining investor confidence in the fairness of the markets . . . . It’s a
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4

trades. Other features of the new stock market have been the subject
of attack as well. “Dark pools” are off-exchange trading venues that
promise to keep secret the existence of the orders sent to them and to
5
restrict the kinds of parties allowed to trade. Dark pools are said to
often break these promises, to the disadvantage of traders sending
6
orders to these venues. A trader is also hurt if her broker fails to send
her order to the trading venue where it will execute at the best price
or in the most timely and reliable fashion. Critics suggest that brokers
often fail in this way, sending the order instead to the venue that pays
the most to the broker through practices such as “payment for order
7
flow” or “maker fees.” Polls now indicate that “roughly two-thirds of
Americans believe the stock market unfairly benefits some at the
8
expense of others,” a belief that some commentators think explains
what has been a sharp drop in the percentage of Americans directly
9
or indirectly owning equities.

growing cancer and needs to be addressed.” Steven Russolillo, Schwab on HFT: ‘Growing
Cancer’ That Must Be Addressed, WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (Apr. 3, 2014, 10:42 AM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/04/03/schwab-on-hft-growing-cancer-that-must-be-addressed
[http://perma.cc/T5JE-MK7T]. These practices, and criticisms of them, are discussed in more
detail in Parts V.A, V.B, and V.C.
4. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part V.E.
6. Sam Mamudi, UBS Hit With Record Dark Pool Fine for Breaking U.S. Rules,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 15, 2015, 12:25 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2015-01-15/sec-finesubs-dark-pool-more-than-14-million-for-breaking-rules.html [http://perma.cc/Y53P-G7MC]
(imposing on UBS the largest fine ever given a dark pool operator); Sam Mamudi, Dark Pools
Opening Up Amid Increased Scrutiny, BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK (May 21, 2014, 12:01 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-21/dark-pools-opening-up-amid-increasedscrutiny [http://perma.cc/9XRT-QEG7] (reporting on industry unease with dark pools). These
practices, and the criticisms of them, are discussed in more detail in Part V.E.
7. See, e.g., William Alden, At Senate Hearing, Brokerage Firms Called Out for Conflicts,
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (June 17, 2014, 9:30 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/
trader-who-called-markets-rigged-tempers-his-critique [http://perma.cc/BLA3-3FC6] (discussing
scrutiny of payment for order flow at recent Congressional hearings); Editorial, The Hidden
Cost of Trading Stocks, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/23/opinion
/best-execution-and-rebates-for-brokers.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/C7TJ-ZGQU] (criticizing
the practice of maker-taker fees). These practices, and the criticisms of them, are discussed in
more detail in Parts V.F and V.G.
8. Conflicts of Interest, Investor Loss of Confidence, and High Speed Trading in U.S. Stock
Markets: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 2 (2014) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin)
[hereinafter High Speed Trading Hearings].
9. See Lydia Saad, U.S. Stock Ownership Stays at Record Low, GALLUP (May 8, 2013),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/162353/stock-ownership-stays-record-low.aspx [http://perma.cc/8H
KC-DBPS] (indicating that in 2013, stock ownership among U.S. adults was at its lowest level
since 1998). Lewis attributes this drop, which has occurred in the face of a sharply rising market
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Actors in the nation’s legal, regulatory, and political arenas have
reacted rapidly to the growing furor over the new stock market. The
U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission have all confirmed investigations into
10
HFTs. Plaintiffs’ class-action lawyers have filed several civil lawsuits
11
based on various controversial market practices. The New York
Attorney General has brought a high-profile lawsuit against the
major investment bank Barclays, alleging it misrepresented to
12
investors the extent to which its dark pool was free of HFT activity.
13
Several Congressional hearings have been held, after which U.S.
Senator Carl Levin wrote to Mary Jo White, the Chair of the SEC,

over the last five years, to a sense that the market is unfair. LEWIS, supra note 2, at 200–01; see
also Editorial, supra note 7 (“There’s no escaping the conclusion that the stock market is not a
level playing field where all investors, large and small, have an equal shot at a fair deal.”).
10. See Keri Geiger & Patricia Hurtado, FBI Seeks Help From High-Frequency Traders to
Find Abuses, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 1, 2014, 1:31 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-0331/fbi-said-to-probe-high-speed-traders-over-abuse-of-information.html [http://perma.cc/WQ67NMH4]; Sarah N. Lynch & Karen Freifeld, SEC Chair Discusses Probes into High-Speed
Trading, REUTERS (Apr. 1, 2014, 7:13 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/01/uscongress-sec-highspeed-idUSBREA301RC20140401 [http://perma.cc/4N7G-UCRN]; Douwe
Miedema, U.S. Futures Regulator CFTC Probing Speed Traders, REUTERS (Apr. 3, 2014, 3:13
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/03/us-hedgefunds-speed-trading-cftc-idUSBREA
321QU20140403 [http://perma.cc/Z4SE-MZL3]; Del Quentin Wilber, Keri Geiger & Patricia
Hurtado, Holder Vows High-Speed Trading Probe to Protect Markets, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 4,
2014, 11:26 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-04/holder-vows-high-speed-tradingprobe-to-protect-markets.html [http://perma.cc/A9JC-6HW9] (DOJ).
11. See Amended Complaint at 1 n.1, City of Providence v. BATS Global Mkts., Inc., No.
14-cv-2811-SMF (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2014) (alleging securities fraud in a class action against every
major stock exchange); Complaint at 10, Flynn v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 14-cv-4321-JMF
(S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2014) (alleging manipulation of securities markets by HFTs); Complaint at
4–5, Lanier v. BATS Exch., Inc., No. 14-cv-3745-KBF (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2014) (alleging breach
of contract based on trading venues’ differential sale-of-information access to HFTs and other
users); Complaint at 3–4, Harel Ins. v. BATS Global Mkts., Inc., No. 14-cv-3608-UA (S.D.N.Y.
May 20, 2014) (alleging that trading venues provided HFTs material non-public information in
return for kickbacks). CME Group Inc., which owns the world’s largest futures market, has
been sued by users accusing it of catering to HFTs. See Complaint at 1, Braman v. CME Group,
Inc., No. 14-cv-2646 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2014).
12. Complaint at 2–4, Schneiderman v. Barclays Capital, Inc., No. 451391/2014 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. June 25, 2014).
13. See, e.g., High Speed Trading Hearings, supra note 8; High Frequency Trading’s Impact
on the Economy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. (2014); Oversight of the SEC’s Division of
Trading and Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored
Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 113th Cong. (2014); The Role of Regulation in Shaping
Equity Market Structure and Electronic Trading: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Hous. & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. (2014) [hereinafter Role of Regulation Hearings].
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demanding significant changes to market structure and the
elimination of “[c]onflicts of interest [that] erode public confidence in
14
the markets.”
It is time to step back and take a serious, dispassionate look at
how the new stock market functions and the implications of the
regulatory choices we face going forward. Legal scholars have done
an able job of applying the insights of many economic theories to law.
This has not been true, however, of the now well-established field of
microstructure economics. Its foundational models of trading
behavior in financial markets are rarely cited in legal scholarship and
15
never discussed in depth. The literature of the field itself, although
empirically sophisticated, lacks a broad-scope, institutionally nuanced
look at the basic dynamics shaping the modern equities market. Thus,
we still lack a comprehensive framework for understanding the new
stock market. The absence of such a framework acts as a serious
obstacle for legislators, regulators, judges, and the public in deciding
how to seriously think about regulating our markets. Much is at stake.
The performance of the equities market has important effects on the
efficiency with which goods and services are produced in our
economy and on the real economy’s rate of growth. Equities also play
a vital role as a place for ordinary individuals to invest their savings.
This Article brings the insights of microstructure economics to bear to
provide a comprehensive framework for thinking about the new stock
market. We demonstrate the usefulness of this framework by
applying it to the new market’s most controversial practices.
Although these practices may seem completely unrelated to each
other, they can all be understood through just three basic
mechanisms: adverse selection, the principal-agent problem, and a
16
multivenue trading system.
We ultimately conclude that no emergency exists requiring
immediate, less-than-fully-considered action. Some reforms proposed
14. Letter from Sen. Carl Levin to Hon. Mary Jo White, Chairman, SEC (July 9, 2014),
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/levin-letter-to-sec-chairman-mary-jo-white-re-equitymarket-structure-july-15_2014 [http://perma.cc/WBK5-G56C].
15. See, e.g., Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a
Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71 (1985) (providing
model of trading behavior under information asymmetries in securities markets); Albert S.
Kyle, Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, 53 ECONOMETRICA 1315 (1985) (providing
model of trading behavior under information asymmetries in securities markets). The seminal
models of Glosten-Milgrom and Kyle have been cited far less than 100 times in any publication
covered by Westlaw’s “Law Reviews & Journals” database.
16. See infra Parts I.D, III.
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by critics, however, appear after analysis, to be unambiguously
desirable. We conclude, for example, that it would be good to require
brokers to pass through maker-taker fees and payment for order flow
to their customers. Other proposed reforms involve a trade-off in
which an improvement in terms of one worthwhile social goal can
only come at a sacrifice of another such goal. In these cases, it may
not be obvious whether a reform is, or is not, desirable, but a better
understanding of the trade-off involved makes for a more informed
choice and may point to areas in which further empirical research
would be useful. We find this to be the case with, for example,
proposals to briefly delay providing HFTs with information
concerning new transactions and quotation changes so that HFTs
have no advantages over other traders. Finally, still other proposed
reforms are bad ideas that seem to be based on a misunderstanding of
how the market really works or of the actual social impact of a given
practice. We find this to be the case with, for example, proposals that
HFTs must keep their quotes in force for some minimum amount of
time and proposals aimed at generally discouraging, or even banning,
trading on dark pools.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses briefly how the
stock market has changed, the eight controversial practices we will
analyze, and the analytic framework that will guide that analysis. Part
II specifies some basic vocabulary; illustrates how, in a multivenue
market, the arrival of a market order, the arrival of a limit order, and
the cancellation of an already standing limit order each results in a
transaction and/or changes the available quotes; and describes how
information concerning the quotes and transactions on these venues
is collected and disseminated. Part III considers the economics of
liquidity supply in the presence of adverse selection, explaining how
the most complex and important of our three factors operates.
Part IV sets out the normative criteria for evaluating the social
impact of a practice or reform. Part V applies our analytic framework
by analyzing each of the new stock market’s eight most controversial
practices and assessing the ultimate impact of each on the multiple
social goals discussed in Part IV. This grand tour of current
controversies also serves as an illustration of how the simple analytic
framework described above can provide the key to understanding the
new stock market more generally. Part VI contains our
recommendations, after which we conclude.
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I. THE NEW STOCK MARKET: CHANGES, CONTROVERSIES, AND
APPROACH
It is important at the outset to see how much the stock market
has changed in a relatively short time and to identify the forces that
have led to this change. It is useful as well to specify in more detail
the most controversial practices associated with the new stock market
and to lay out the basics of our approach to these practices and the
operations of the new market.
A. How the Stock Market Has Changed
The stock market is an institution that connects potential buyers
and sellers of companies’ stocks. As recently as the early 1990s,
trading in the stock of each publicly traded company of any
significance was still largely confined to a single venue, either
17
NASDAQ or the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). At
NASDAQ, a dealer was the purchaser of every share sold by a trader
and the seller of every share bought by a trader. The dealer did so at
quoted prices generated through the calculation and judgment of an
individual human being. At the NYSE, where there was an actual
floor, the specialist for a stock, also a human being, often played a
similar dealer role, but in addition posted quotes sent in by traders
willing to buy or sell at stated prices, held auctions, and helped
18
arrange trades by brokers and traders on the floor.
Today, any given stock is potentially traded in each of almost
sixty competing venues: eleven exchanges and almost fifty dark
19
pools. The NASDAQ dealers and the NYSE specialists are gone.
Almost all of these competing trading venues are electronic limit
order books, in which a trader can post a limit order, which is its firm
commitment until cancelled, to buy or sell up to a specified number of
20
shares at a quoted price. A computer (the venue’s matching engine)

17. See generally George T. Simon & Kathryn M. Trkla, The Regulation of Specialists and
Implications for the Future, 61 BUS. LAW. 217, 225–27 (2005) (explaining the history of NYSE
and NASDAQ procedures).
18. See LAWRENCE E. HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE
FOR PRACTITIONERS 89–111 (2003) (discussing the structure of the traditional NYSE and
NASDAQ exchanges).
19. LAURA TUTTLE, ALTERNATIVE TRADING SYSTEMS: DESCRIPTION OF ATS TRADING
IN NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM STOCKS 5–6 (2013), http://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/
research/ats_data_paper_october_2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/8J3D-JVBZ].
20. See infra Part II.A. For a posted sell limit order, this stated limit price is an “offer.” For
a posted buy limit order, this stated limit price is a “bid.”
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matches these posted limit orders with incoming buy and sell market
orders, which are orders from traders willing to trade at whatever is
21
the best available price in the market.
Today, HFTs post a majority of the limit orders that are matched
22
in this fashion and result in executed trades. An HFT uses highspeed communications to constantly update its information
concerning transactions occurring in each stock that it regularly
trades, as well as changes in the buy and sell limit orders posted by
others on every major trading venue. This information is
automatically fed into a computer that uses algorithms to change the
limit prices and quantities associated with the HFT’s own limit orders
23
posted on each of the various trading venues. More than threequarters of all trades in the United States are executed on one or
24
another of these electronic limit order book venues. Most of the
remaining trades involve a broker internally matching the buy and
25
sell orders received from retail customers.
B. Forces for Change and the Role of Regulation
This transformation to the new stock market is a product of the
fantastic increases in the speed of communication and calculation that
have arisen from the information-technology revolution. The new
stock market’s particular structure, though, is due in important part to
choices made by Congress and the SEC. The initial impetus for this
new market structure goes back to Congress’s adoption in 1975 of the
National Market System (NMS) amendments to the Securities

21. The computer will also match the limit orders posted on the venue with “marketable
limit orders.” A buy limit order is “marketable” when it has a limit price greater than or equal
to the lowest offer in the market and a sell limit order is “marketable” when it has a limit price
less than or equal to the highest bid. See infra Part II.A.
22. See Jonathan A. Brogaard, High Frequency Trading and its Impact on Market Quality
2, 11 (July 16, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.futuresindustry.org/ptg/downloads/
HFT_Trading.pdf [http://perma.cc/5KCG-JVC4] (finding based on NASDAQ data set that
HFTs supply liquidity for 51 percent of all trades and provide the market quotes 50 percent of
the time); see generally Albert J. Menkveld, High Frequency Trading and the New-Market
Makers, 16 J. FIN. MKTS. 712 (2013) (exploring the role of HFTs as market makers in today’s
market).
23. See Charles R. Korsmo, High-Frequency Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48 U. RICH. L.
REV. 523, 540 (2014) (defining attributes of HFTs).
24. LAURA TUTTLE, OTC TRADING: DESCRIPTION OF NON-ATS OTC TRADING IN
NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM STOCKS 11 (2014), https://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research/
otc_trading_march_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/VP6V-T6KV].
25. For a discussion of internalization, see infra Parts I.C.8, V.G, and VI.D.
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26

Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act). Multiple, competing
trading venues have the upside of the greater efficiency and higher
rate of innovation that are likely to arise from competition. They have
the possible downside that orders from potential traders are
fragmented among multiple venues, which makes it less likely that
willing buyers and sellers can easily find each other and transact.
Congress, in its adoption of the NMS amendments, foresaw that
improving information technology could significantly reduce this
downside by making it easier for traders to see what is going on in
27
each of these venues. The NMS amendments pushed the system to
develop in this direction, a push that has been consistently supported
28
by the SEC.
This decision favoring multiple venues is unlikely to be reversed
in the foreseeable future. Data concerning the speed of trading, its
cost, and the apparent amount of liquidity in the system suggest that
the new stock market is a substantial improvement over what came
29
before it. Today’s technology, if it instead were operating within a
26. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
27. Alexander P. Okuliar, Financial Exchange Consolidation and Antitrust: Is There A
Need for More Intervention?, 28 ANTITRUST, no. 2, Spring 2014, at 66, 67 (explaining changes
implemented by the SEC to satisfy Congress’s vision for Regulation NMS).
28. Congress, when the NMS amendments were adopted, expected a proliferation of
competing venues. It self-consciously rejected a proposal for an electronic limit order book in
which all order flow was directed to a single trading venue, known as a central limit order book
(CLOB). See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 94-75, at 12 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 190
(rejecting the role for “the SEC . . . as an ‘economic czar’ for the development of a national
market system” and noting that “a fundamental premise of the bill is that . . . a national market
system . . . will depend upon the vigor of competition within the securities industry”); DIV. OF
MKT. REGULATION, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF
CURRENT EQUITY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS app. III at 6 (1994) (discussing vigorous industry
opposition to the SEC’s proposal of a CLOB in the 1970s); see also Milton H. Cohen, The
National Market System—A Modest Proposal, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743, 774 (1978) (“But to
accord ultimate and total benefit of the auction process to all orders is impossible unless that
process is concentrated in one location (which Congress certainly did not set as a goal of the
national market system) . . . .”); Lawrence R. Glosten, Is the Electronic Limit Order Book
Inevitable?, 49 J. FIN. 1127, 1129 (1994) (discussing mechanics of a CLOB); Craig Pirrong, The
Thirty Years War, 28 REGULATION, no. 2, Summer 2005, at 54, 56 (explaining that a CLOB
would effectively function as a public utility and the problems attendant to that status).
29. See JAMES J. ANGEL, LAWRENCE E. HARRIS & CHESTER S. SPATT, EQUITY TRADING
IN THE 21ST CENTURY: AN UPDATE 11–12 (2013), http://www.q-group.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/01/Equity-Trading-in-the-21st-Century-An-Update-FINAL1.pdf [http://perma.cc/H2Q7CV3X] (showing significant increases in the speed of execution, decreases in the bid-ask spread,
decreases in commissions, and increases in the number of quotes per minute); see also James J.
Angel, Lawrence E. Harris & Chester S. Spatt, Equity Trading in the 21st Century 7–26
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centralized single-venue system, might of course have led to even
greater improvements—a possibility that is the subject of continuing
30
debate among academic theorists —but this is entirely a matter of
speculation. Moreover, as a matter of political economy, any attempt
to reverse the decision for multiple venues would meet stiff resistance
from those who have built businesses based on an assumption that the
multivenue structure will continue. So, to the extent that the
criticisms of the new stock market have merit, the challenge will be to
design reforms within the current multivenue system.
C. The Eight Most Controversial Practices
Eight practices said to occur within the new stock market have
attracted particular controversy. Although they will be analyzed in
detail in Parts V and VI of this Article, it is helpful to introduce them
at this point, using, in each case, a simple example.
Note at the outset that each of the first three of these practices
involves an HFT benefiting itself by taking advantage of having a “colocation” facility at each exchange. Co-location involves the HFT
having a computer located right next to an exchange’s matching
engine. This arrangement allows the HFT to find out about
transactions occurring on the exchange, and changes in quoted prices,
sooner than other traders. It also allows the HFT to cancel old limit
orders posted on the exchange, and submit new ones, very quickly.
The HFT’s co-location facility at each exchange is connected to its colocation facility at every other exchange by specialized fiber-optic
cables, which permit extremely rapid communication among the
HFT’s co-location facilities at the different exchanges, all of which
have their matching engines in northern New Jersey.

(Marshall Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. FBE 09-10, 2010), http://modernmarkets
initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Equity-Trading-in-the-21st-Century.pdf [http://perma.
cc/5J9P-Y796] (discussing recent technology improvements in trading systems and their
impacts).
30. See generally, e.g., Jean-Edouard Colliard & Thierry Foucault, Trading Fees and
Efficiency in Limit Order Markets, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 3389 (2012) (discussing the drawbacks of
a decentralized trading system when compared with a hypothetical single system); Thierry
Foucault & Albert J. Menkveld, Competition for Order Flow and Smart Order Routing Systems,
63 J. FIN. 119 (2008) (exploring the effects of market fragmentation on Euronext and the
London Stock Exchange); see also Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,530 (June 29, 2005)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200) (announcing the adoption of rules governing the
dissemination of market data); Pirrong, supra note 28, at 54 (discussing Regulation NMS).
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1. HFT electronic front running. Suppose an institutional
investor wishes to buy a very large number of shares of a given stock.
The investor breaks the desired quantity into several smaller, but still
sizable, marketable orders, each going to a different exchange.
Through its co-location facility, an HFT learns of the transaction at
the exchange that is reached first by the investor’s orders. The HFT’s
algorithm infers from this information that, quite possibly, similar
sizable orders are en route to other exchanges as well. The algorithm
instantly sends out signals to make advantageous adjustments in the
HFT’s limit orders posted on these other exchanges, adjustments that
are completed within the tiny interval before the institution’s orders
reach these other exchanges. Critics of the practice point to the fact
that the institutional investor pays more for its shares than if these
adjustments had not been made, while the HFT, using its information
31
advantage, is benefited.
2. HFT slow-market arbitrage. Suppose that on another day, the
same HFT has posted on one exchange buy and sell limit orders that
respectively represent the highest bid and lowest offer prices
available on any exchange in the market for a particular stock. The
HFT’s bid and offer are reported as such on the national system for
reporting what, across all the exchanges, is the best available bid and
offer for the stock. Then, an institutional investor, wishing to sell a
substantial quantity of this stock, posts a new limit offer on a second
exchange that is lower in price than the HFT’s offer. Through the
HFT’s co-location facilities at the second exchange, the HFT almost
instantaneously observes the arrival of this new better offer. There is
a short period of time before the national reporting system reflects
this new better offer, during which lag the HFT has the possibility of
making a certain profit. The HFT leaves standing its offer on the first
exchange. During the reporting lag, this offer continues to appear to
the market, based on the national reporting system, to be the lowestprice offer available. If a market buy order arrives at this first
exchange before the national reporting system reflects the new better
offer on the second exchange, the market order will execute against
the HFT’s offer on the first market at the higher price. The HFT can
then repurchase the same quantity of shares on the second exchange
at the lower price being offered by the institutional investor, thereby
making the HFT a certain profit. Critics point out trading is a zero31. See infra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
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sum game and so the HFT’s profit comes at the expense of the other
32
traders in the market.
3. HFT exploitation of midpoint orders sitting in dark pools. On
yet another day, suppose an institutional trader posts a midpoint limit
buy order in a dark pool. This is an order that, until cancelled, will
execute against any market sell order that subsequently arrives at the
dark pool and will do so at a price equal to what, at the moment of
execution, is the midpoint between the best offer and best bid
reported to be available on any of the exchanges by the national
reporting system. The HFT from our previous examples very rapidly
observes, through its co-location facilities, that the quotes have
changed on one exchange such that the new best offer on that
exchange is lower than the midpoint between what, until that
moment, had been the best bid and best offer available on any public
exchange. Again, for a short period of time, the national reporting
system will not reflect the new better offer that has already been
observed by the HFT. The HFT purchases shares at the new better
price and then immediately sends a sell order to the dark pool, which
executes against the trader’s order at the midpoint between the stillofficial, but now-stale, best offer and best bid reported by the national
system. Because the price paid for the shares by the HFT on the
exchange is lower than the price at which they are sold to the trader
in the dark pool, the HFT makes a profit. Critics point out again that
33
this profit comes at the expense of the other traders in the market.
4. HFT activities leading to increased volatility and crashes. In the
same period that the new stock market was emerging, with the large
role played by HFTs, there was an upsurge in the volatility of share
prices. The new market has also had a number of brief crashes and
breakdowns in trading, which have been attributed to HFT
algorithms receiving market information that leads the HFTs to
34
suddenly exit the market.
5. Large investment banks in their role as brokers steering orders
to their own dark pools. An institutional investor uses a large
investment bank as its broker to handle a buy limit order and the

32. Id.
33. See infra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 119–21 and accompanying text.
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bank steers the institution’s order to a dark pool that the bank
operates. The bank’s proprietary traders learn through an internal
source of the existence of the institution’s order. Unless cancelled,
this order may sit in the dark pool until such time that the bank’s
proprietary traders decide it is advantageous for them to send in an
order to execute against the institution’s limit order (which would
mean the execution is disadvantageous for the institutional investor).
6. Large investment banks in their role as brokers ignoring
customer directions to send orders to a specified venue. Suppose the
institution using this investment bank as a broker fears its order will
be sent to the bank’s dark pool and suffer the fate described above.
The institution therefore specifies that its order be sent to an
alternative venue. The bank ignores the direction and sends the order
to its own dark pool anyway. Even if the trader detects that this has
happened, which may be difficult to do, it may not switch brokers
because it may feel tied to the large bank due to the free “soft
35
money” research services the bank provides. Market solutions to this
large investment bank’s violation of its duty to provide best execution
for its customer may not work effectively under these circumstances.
7. Venue “maker-taker” and “taker-maker” fees paid to brokers.
It is common for an exchange to make payments to brokers to prompt
the brokers to steer certain kinds of orders in its direction and charge
brokers for other kinds of orders they send to the exchange. Under
the “maker-taker” model, the exchange pays for certain limit orders it
receives that are ultimately executed and charges for each marketable
order it receives that executes immediately against the limit orders
posted on it. Under the “taker-maker” model, the venue does the
opposite. Critics characterize each of these arrangements as a system
of bribes. The critics argue they create incentives for brokers to direct

35. “Soft money” research consists of ancillary services provided to an institutional
investor by a broker free of direct charge (that is, “hard money”) in return for that investor
directing order flow to that broker. Soft-money arrangements can be desirable from an
institutional investor’s perspective because it passes the cost of the soft-money research on to
the client (in the form of inferior or costlier execution by the broker), rather than as part of the
direct cost of the institutional investor’s own services to clients. See OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE,
INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INSPECTION REPORT ON THE
SOFT DOLLAR PRACTICES OF BROKER-DEALERS, INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND MUTUAL
FUNDS 6 (1998), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/softdolr.htm [http://perma.cc/2AL3-5CVN].
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customer orders to the venue that pays the highest rebate, rather than
36
the one that delivers best execution for the customer.
8. Payment for order flow. For a fee, a brokerage firm may sell
to another firm (an “order-execution facility”) its full order flow of
buy and sell market orders from a certain kind of customer, typically
retail investors, who are considered “uninformed.” The other firm
promises to execute each purchased order at a price that is at least
slightly improved over the best offer or bid available in the market at
the time the order is placed. Selling order flow in this fashion
essentially outsources what a large retail broker might otherwise do
internally. This would be matching nearly simultaneous buy and sell
orders, buying from the seller at a price slightly over the best bid in
the market and selling to the buyer at a price slightly below the best
offer in the market, and making the difference between the price paid
and the price received as a profit. Critics characterize payment for
order flow as another kind of bribe. They argue it creates an incentive
for the broker to direct their customer orders to the venue that pays
the highest rebate, rather than the one that most improves the prices
37
sellers receive and buyers pay.
D. The Analytic Framework
Most of the criticism of the new stock market simply consists of
taking a representative single transaction involving one of these eight
practices, showing the transaction benefits one party at the expense of
another, and labeling the resulting transfer as “larcenous,”
38
“extractive,” “predatory,” or simply “unfair.”
Serious analysis requires digging deeper. There needs to be a
consideration of the effects of each of these practices as something
that occurs on a repeated basis among competing actors, taking into
account the reaction of the various other participants in the market to
their knowledge that the practice is transpiring. Additionally, these
effects need to be evaluated in terms of their ultimate impact on the
multiple social goals—the evaluative criteria discussed in detail in
Part IV—that equity-trading markets are expected to serve and that
form the justificatory basis for regulation when the markets fall short.

36. See infra notes 159–61 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 172–74 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., infra notes 96, 108 and accompanying text.
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Our analytic framework for undertaking this analysis has a
surprisingly simple foundation. Though each of the eight most
controversial practices seems highly distinct, they can all be
understood by reference to just three basic concepts:
Adverse selection. Markets benefit enormously from businesses
that compete to post limit orders on venues against which marketable
orders can transact, because the availability of these limit orders
substantially increases liquidity. These businesses are referred to as
“liquidity providers” or “market makers.” A professional supplier of
liquidity for an issuer’s shares—today, typically an HFT—engages in
both the frequent purchase and frequent sale of these shares. The
liquidity supplier makes money if on average it sells the shares it buys
for more than the price it paid. Its biggest problem is adverse
selection: the possibility that the person who anonymously places an
order that executes against the liquidity supplier’s quote is doing so
because the trader has private information about a stock’s value,
which is not known to most of the market or to the liquidity supplier.
In such a situation, the liquidity supplier will on average lose money
on the trade. To survive in a competitive market, the liquidity
supplier must set its bid and offer quotes—the limits on the purchase
and sell orders it posts on trading venues—aggressively enough to
attract business, but not so aggressively that the money it makes from
buying from, and selling to, uninformed traders is less than what it
loses from engaging in such transactions with informed traders.
Liquidity providers, to minimize adverse selection, work to identify
which orders come from informed traders. Informed traders, in turn,
work to prevent their orders from being so identified.
Principal-agent problems. Most traders are not allowed to send
their orders directly to a trading venue due to the need to ensure that
contracts involving the exchange of securities for cash are reliably
completed. Instead, they must use a broker. The broker needs to be
given a certain amount of discretion to be able to handle the order of
the trader. Principal-agent problems arise because it is impossible to
design a contract that cost-effectively assures that the broker (the
39
agent) will act in the best interests of the trader (the principal).
Multiple venues. As discussed above, Congress and the SEC
consciously chose to encourage the development of multiple
39. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976)
(providing the canonical model of a principal-agent problem).
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competing venues for the trading of any given issuer’s stock, rather
than one centralized trading venue. Each of the eight most
controversial practices is related, in one way or another, to some
aspect of the system that arises from this fundamental policy choice.
The fact that the adverse-selection-driven cat-and-mouse game
between liquidity suppliers and informed traders occurs within a
world with multiple trading venues, combined with rapid advances in
information technology, explains the new stock market’s
extraordinary complexity and is key to understanding the social
consequences of many of its most criticized practices. This
complexity, in turn, has created new scope for principal-agent
problems between brokers and traders. Although the new stock
market feels bewildering, the central claim of this Article is that by
understanding how these three factors interact in a competitive
environment, a reader can understand most of what is happening.
II. PRIMER ON THE MECHANICS OF THE NEW STOCK MARKET
In order to evaluate the critiques of the new stock market and
consider what reforms might be warranted, understanding the
mechanics of this market is important. Readers well versed in these
mechanics should skip this discussion and move on to Part III.
A. Vocabulary
Before tackling the plumbing of an electronic-limit-order-based
market, it is worthwhile to specify in more detail some vocabulary
that helps to describe both what traders are seeking to accomplish
with the orders they send to trading venues and the services that
trading venues offer these traders.
1. Quotes and depth. Suppose at 1:59:32 PM on July 10, 2014,
Maria decides she wants to buy 200 shares of Apple. She contacts her
broker and discovers the best quotes for Apple: the national best bid
(NBB) is $95.28 and the national best offer (NBO) is $95.29, with a
depth, respectively, of 500 and 1,000 shares. In other words, according
to the national reporting system, on one or more trading venues,
there are one or more buyers willing to pay $95.28 per share for up to
500 shares in aggregate (but no one willing to pay more) and one or
more sellers willing to provide up to 1,000 shares in aggregate for
$95.29 (but no one willing to charge less).
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2. Market orders, marketable limit orders, and marketable orders.
One possibility is that Maria submits a market buy order for 200
shares, that is, an unconditional order to buy at whatever is the best
(that is, lowest) price available. Because she places no limit on what
she is willing to pay, the order will execute almost immediately. It will
do so at $95.29 unless the NBO, as reported by the national reporting
system, has changed by the time her order arrives at the trading
40
venue to which it is ultimately sent. If the NBO has changed by that
time, the order would execute at the new NBO.
Another possibility is that Maria, knowing the current quotes,
but wanting to protect herself in case the NBO moves up too much
before her order can execute, places the order for 200 shares but with
the caveat that she will not pay more than $95.31. In other words,
41
Maria has submitted a limit buy order for 200 shares at $95.31.
Given that the NBO at the time Maria sent the order, $95.29, is
below—that is, at least as favorable as—Maria’s $95.31 limit, we refer
42
to her order as a marketable buy limit order. This is because it will
behave just like a market order and execute at whatever is the thencurrent NBO unless the NBO has changed and has moved to above
$95.31 in the brief time it takes her order to arrive at the trading
43
venue to which it is ultimately sent. For this reason, we call both
market orders and marketable limit orders marketable orders.
3. Nonmarketable limit orders. In contrast, a nonmarketable buy
limit order is a buy limit order with a price limit below the NBO at the
time it is sent. It is called nonmarketable because at that moment, no
one in the market is willing to sell at a price this low. Similarly, a
40. If there are at least 200 shares available at $95.29 at the venue to which Maria’s broker
sends the order, the order will execute on this venue. If not, NMS Rule 611 requires that the
venue have procedures in place to send all, or the unsatisfied part, of the order on to another
venue where shares are available at the NBO of $95.29. See infra Part II.C. A market sell order
would work the same way if she instead wished to sell 200 shares, and, unless the NBB changed,
would execute almost immediately at $95.28.
41. A limit sell order would be a sell order with the caveat that the person placing it would
not accept less than a certain price.
42. A sell limit order in which the NBB at the time the order is sent is above—that is, at
least as favorable as—the order’s limit is referred to as a marketable sell limit order.
43. Quotes in fact can move quite quickly. In the ten minutes following when Maria first
contacted her broker and noted the best offer of $95.29, the offer was at one point as low as
$95.28 and as high as $95.33. If, by the time the order arrives, the NBO had moved above
$95.31, Maria’s limit order would not execute even though it was considered “marketable” when
sent. Note, however, that the order, until its expiration or cancellation, remains a commitment
to buy 200 shares at $95.31 or less.
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nonmarketable sell limit order is a sell limit order with a price limit
above the NBB at the time it is sent, because at that moment, no one
in the market is willing to buy at a price this high.
4. Where bid and offer quotes come from. The foregoing shows
that equity-market trading venues provide a place for market
participants to display a variety of different trading interests. In the
market we have described, the best offer quote is $95.29 with a depth
of 1,000 shares. This is the result of persons who had previously
posted still-in-effect nonmarketable sell orders with a limit of $95.29
that aggregate to 1,000 shares (that is, sell orders with a limit price
44
above the NBB, which in our example is $98.28).
5. Making and taking liquidity. The persons who have posted
these standing nonmarketable limit sell orders have provided Maria
with the option to trade immediately at $95.29, an option she can
exercise by sending in a marketable order. We say that these persons
have provided liquidity or that they are makers of liquidity. Maria,
who in our examples takes advantage of this ability to trade
immediately by submitting either a market order or a marketable
limit order, consumes liquidity. She is a taker of liquidity.
6. The trade-off between taking and making liquidity. If Maria is
willing to be less aggressive, she can instead attempt to acquire her
Apple shares by putting in a nonmarketable limit order to buy 200
shares at $95.28. Then, if the quotes do not change by the time her
order reaches the market, she will be adding 200 more shares to the
already existing NBB for 500 shares at $95.28. Thus, if she follows this
less-aggressive strategy, she can be a maker, not a taker, of liquidity,
even though, unlike an HFT, she is not in the business of liquidity
supply.
If Maria follows this less-aggressive strategy and a sufficient
number of marketable sell orders come in before her offer expires or
is cancelled, Maria’s limit order will execute and she will have paid a
penny less per share. If a sufficient number of such sell orders do not
come in, her order will fail to execute. She then runs the risk that she
may still want to purchase the shares and that the offer quotes will
44. Similarly, the best bid quote is $95.28 with a depth of 500 shares. This is the result of
persons who had previously posted still-in-effect nonmarketable buy orders with a limit of
$95.28 that aggregate to 500 shares (that is, buy orders with a limit price below the NBO, which
in our example is $98.29).
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have moved up, in which case she will have to pay more than the
$95.29 per share she would have paid had she initially submitted a
marketable order. Market orders provide speed and certainty of
execution. Limit orders may obtain a better price but are less certain
to execute.
B. The Mechanics of Trading on a Single Venue
In order to understand the dynamics of a multivenue electroniclimit-order-book market and the standard approach to its depiction, it
is convenient to begin the discussion by considering how trades would
45
be depicted if we instead had just a single trading venue. In the
Section following, we will add the complications involved with the
multivenue system we have today.
1. Depicting the initial book. As an example, consider the initial
state of an order book for a stock such as XYZ. This book (that is, the
collection of standing limit orders) can be depicted as follows:
BIDS

OFFERS

PRICE

SHARES

PRICE

SHARES

30.48

500

30.50

700

30.46

200

30.51

300

30.45

300

30.52

400

30.44

200

30.57

400

In this case, the best offer is $30.50 with 700 shares available, and
46
the best bid is $30.48 with 500 shares available. This simple

45. This is the way a CLOB market would work. As already noted, though the matter is
controversial, some commentators believe it would have been better if Congress had required
that there be a single venue rather than pushing for the competitive, multivenue system that has
in fact developed. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
46. Note that the lowest offer of $30.50 is above the highest bid of $30.48. If that were not
the case, then the seller and buyer should transact given that the seller would be willing to
accept less than the buyer is willing to pay. Thus, under normal circumstances, the lowest offer
resting on a venue should exceed the highest bid.
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description of the “top of the book” is all the information the typical
retail investor receives. Notice, however, that this description does
not fully describe the market. For example, this simple top-of-thebook description does not reveal that investors have bid 500
additional and offered 700 additional shares within three cents of the
best market quotes. In other words, information about the depth of
the book beyond the best bid and offer is revealed only by a full order
book. Notice also that even with the fuller depiction set out above,
one cannot tell whether the book consists of seven offers of 100
shares each at $30.50 or one offer of 700 shares.
2. Depicting a marketable limit buy order. Suppose that Anna
decides she wishes to buy 400 shares of XYZ, but is not willing to pay
more than $30.60 per share. Accordingly, she instructs her broker to
submit a limit order to buy 400 shares with a limit price of $30.60.
Because $30.60 is above the best offer of $30.50 and more than 400
shares are available at $30.50, her order is marketable and would
transact immediately at a price of $30.50.
Regulation NMS requires that a report of the executed
transaction—a sale of 400 shares at $30.50—be sent almost
immediately to a publicly disseminated last-trade data stream that
47
forms the national reporting system for transactions. The venue is
also allowed to simultaneously send the same last-trade report to
persons, including co-locating HFTs, that contract with it to receive a
48
direct feed. Regulation NMS also requires that a report of the
changes in the quotes—the reduction in the number of shares offered
at $30.50 from 700 to 300—be sent to a publicly disseminated quote
49
stream that forms the national reporting system for quotes (and
again, the venue may simultaneously send this information to
50
contracting persons such as co-locating HFTs with a direct feed).
The new order book, reflecting this change, would appear as follows:

47. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.601(b)(2) (2015).
48. Id. See infra Part VI.A.3 (providing a fuller description and discussion of proposed
reforms to this practice).
49. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.602 (2015).
50. See, e.g., Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No.
61,358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3601 (Jan. 14, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
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OFFERS

PRICE

SHARES

PRICE

SHARES

30.48

500

30.50

300

30.46

200

30.51

300

30.45

300

30.52

100

30.44

200

30.57

400

3. Depicting a nonmarketable limit buy order. Suppose that another
investor, Dave, prompted by this new state of the book, decides he
wishes to buy 200 shares of XYZ, but is not willing to pay more than
$30.49 per share. Accordingly, he instructs his broker to submit a limit
order to buy 200 shares with a limit price of $30.49. Because $30.49 is
below the best offer of $30.50, his order is nonmarketable and no
transaction will occur. Instead, his limit order will be posted on the
limit order book. Because he is expressing his willingness to buy at
$30.49, it becomes a bid for 200 shares at this price. Because $30.49 is
higher than the previous best bid, Dave’s limit order becomes the new
best bid, thereby reducing the spread between the best bid and the
best offer by a penny (though also reducing depth at the best bid to
200 shares). The new book reflecting the posting of this new order
would appear as follows:
BIDS

OFFERS

PRICE

SHARES

PRICE

SHARES

30.49

200

30.50

300

30.48

500

30.51

300

30.46

200

30.52

100

30.45

300

30.57

400

30.44

200
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Information about the new state of the book would be
disseminated as in the last example.
4. Symmetry for sell orders. We have presented the dynamics
associated with buy orders: both marketable buy orders, which reduce
what is available on the offer side of the book, and nonmarketable
buy orders, which add to the bid side of the book. The situation is
symmetric for sell orders—both marketable sell orders, which reduce
what is available on the bid side of the book, and nonmarketable sell
orders, which add to the offer side of the book.
C. The Mechanics of Trading on Multiple Exchanges
With multiple exchanges, the order book dynamics are similar,
but the routing of the order can be much more complicated. Part of
the complication comes from Regulation NMS Rule 611, which
requires that a marketable sell order—regardless of the trading venue
to which it is originally sent—execute at a price equal to the best bid
available on any exchange in the country, and a marketable buy order
51
at the best offer. To see how this works, consider the following
consolidated-limit-order book, which aggregates the quotes from all
the exchanges in the country. The aggregate number of shares bid or
offered at any given exchange is identified by a single letter
corresponding to that exchange.

51. Federal regulation requires trading venues to establish procedures reasonably designed
to prevent the purchase or sale of a stock at a price inferior to the lowest offer or highest bid,
respectively, which is disseminated on the national reporting system for quotations. See 17
C.F.R. § 242.611(a)(1) (2015) (establishing the rule); id. § 242.600(b) (defining relevant terms).
Regulation NMS is the most important body of federal regulation governing trading in the stock
market.
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OFFERS

PRICE

SHARES

PRICE

SHARES

30.48

Q 300
P 200

30.50

Q 500
P 100
Z 100

30.46

Q 200

30.51

Q 500
D 100

30.45

Z 300

30.52

Q 400

30.44

Z 200

30.57

Q 400

Now consider Maria wanting to purchase 1,000 shares. One way
to accomplish this is for her broker to send the following market buy
orders: 800 shares to Q, 100 shares to P, 100 shares to Z. Assuming
the quotes are still good by the time her order arrives at these
respective venues, she would pay an average price of $30.503. If speed
were important and there was reason to think that the order would
reach Q first, it might appear to be better to send the whole 1,000share order to Q and pay the slightly higher average price of $30.505.
52
Because of Rule 611, however, sending the whole order to Q would
not have this result. Instead, Q is required to have a system that
would forward 100-share orders to each of P and Z, at which shares
were also available at the NBO of $30.50. These orders would execute
on these venues at this price. On Q, 500 shares would execute at
$30.50 and the remaining 300 at $30.51. Again, the average price
would be $30.503.
The preceding discussion, however, assumes that everyone
involved is instantly aware of all newly executed transactions and all
changes in quotes. It also assumes that orders can be sent and
cancelled instantaneously. Things become more interesting when we
drop these unrealistic assumptions. Consider first how Maria’s broker
became aware of the quotations and how Q knows about offers on P
and Z at $30.50. Traditionally, each exchange independently provided
52. Id. § 242.611(a)(1).
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quotation and transaction information. As discussed, however, the
1975 NMS amendments to the Exchange Act included broad
provisions for consolidating information in the U.S. stock market,
which reflected the congressional vision of an electronically linked
market made up of competing venues trading in the stock of the same
53
issuers. Full realization of this vision, including rules leading to the
construction of the national reporting system for quotes and
transactions, took thirty years, culminating in the SEC’s adoption of
54
Regulation NMS.
According to the rules, a trading venue must participate in
55
reporting plans with the SEC, which must approve these plans. The
plan must provide that there is a system by which the best bid and
best offer quotes posted on the venue for each issuer’s stock traded
there is furnished to an exclusive processor. The price and size of all
transactions in each of these stocks executed on the venue must also
be furnished. The exclusive processor consolidates all of this
information with the information the processor acquires concerning
each of the same stocks from the other venues where they trade.
From all this, the exclusive processor constructs a consolidated book
depicting the best offer and best bid for a stock, at each of the venues
at which it trades and the corresponding sizes. The exclusive
processor must make this quote information, as well as price and size
information concerning the latest executed transactions in the stock,
56
available to the public on terms that are fair and reasonable. At any
point in time, the best bid and best offer on this consolidated book
represents the official NBB and NBO.
It takes a short period of time for the national reporting system
to reflect any change in the quotations on a venue or any transaction
executed on that venue. Thus, the national reporting system lags
slightly behind any change in what is the best bid or offer available at
any venue. As we noted in our initial descriptions of electronic front
running, slow-market arbitrage, and dark-pool-midpoint-order
exploitation, HFTs can—through co-location, private-data feeds, and
53. Section 11A(c)(1)(B) provides, inter alia, that the SEC should “assure the prompt,
accurate, reliable, and fair . . . distribution” of transaction information. Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29 (June 4, 1975), 89 Stat. 97, 115 (1975).
54. Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496 (June 25,
2005).
55. 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.600(b)(21), 242.601, 242.603, 242.608 (2015) (establishing plan
requirement and rules).
56. See id. §§ 242.601, 242.602, 242.608.
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superior information-technology infrastructure—become aware of
changes in offers or bids, or of newly executed transactions, before
the information becomes available to the public from the exclusive
57
processor. During this brief reporting lag, they can act on this
information by cancelling standing limit orders and posting new ones.
Thus, by the time Maria sees the quotes depicted in the sample
consolidated book above, they may no longer in fact be available. The
same is true for venue Q at the time her order arrives there.
III. THE ECONOMICS OF LIQUIDITY PROVISION
A professional supplier of liquidity for an issuer’s shares—today,
typically an HFT posting buy and sell limit orders—engages in both
the frequent purchase and frequent sale of these shares. In doing so, it
stands ready to buy and sell shares up to stated amounts at stated
prices. The liquidity supplier makes money if on average it sells the
shares it buys for more than the price paid. It might appear that doing
so is easy, even in markets with a one cent spread: buy at the bid and
sell at the offer and make a half cent per share on every transaction.
Do this for a billion shares and pretty soon you are talking about real
money. In fact, however, it is not so easy.
The persons with whom a liquidity supplier trades generally do
not reveal their identities. The possibility always exists that the
person (the “trader”) who places a marketable order that executes
against the liquidity supplier’s quote is doing so because the trader
has private information not known to most of the market or to the
58
liquidity supplier. An informed trader of this kind will buy from the
liquidity supplier when her private information suggests that the
stock’s value is above the liquidity provider’s offer. And she will sell
to the liquidity supplier when her private information suggests the
value is below the liquidity provider’s bid. In such transactions, the
liquidity supplier sells at prices below the value of the stock and buys
at prices above the value of the stock, not a formula for success.
Despite this, the liquidity supplier, if skillful, can still make money on
a net basis, because the remaining traders with whom it transacts do
not possess private information and the liquidity supplier can profit
on these transactions.

57. See supra Part I.C.
58. See HARRIS, supra note 18, at 158 (discussing analyses indicating that in most markets
adverse selection accounts for the majority of the bid-ask spread).
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A. Kinds of Private Information and Their Sources
There are three primary kinds of private information, which we
will label inside information, announcement information, and
fundamental value information.
1. Inside information. Inside information has its ultimate origins
from within some institutional source. Frequently, this institutional
source is the issuing company of the stock itself. This is information
the institution seeks to prevent from becoming public or from being
the basis of trading by others. Trading on such information is, under
many circumstances, illegal under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
59
and Rule 10b-5. The existence of cases of successful prosecutions
under these provisions shows that such information is the basis of at
60
least some of the informed trading that occurs in the market.
2. Announcement information. Announcement information is
information that has only just been publicly revealed, for example a
government statistic about the economy or a company’s earnings
announcement. A trader who acts on this information extremely
quickly, before other traders and the liquidity suppliers themselves
can react, is also an informed trader.
3. Fundamental value information.
Fundamental value
information is a superior estimate of an issuer’s future cash flows
based on a person gathering bits of publicly available information and
analyzing that information in a sophisticated way. The traders whose
trades are informed due to this kind of information include hedge
funds, actively managed mutual and pension funds, nonprofit
institutions, and very wealthy individuals with actively managed
portfolios. Liquidity suppliers are vulnerable to trades based on these
superior estimates because liquidity suppliers tend to specialize in the
business of supplying liquidity. Thus, they generally do not engage in
their own fundamental analysis.
B. Adverse Selection
Whatever the source of an informed trader’s private information,
the liquidity provider will be subject to adverse selection and lose
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015).
60. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 649–66 (1997) (reinstating an insidertrading conviction).
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money when it buys at the bid from informed sellers or sells at the
offer to informed buyers. As long as there are enough uninformed
traders willing to suffer the inevitable expected trading losses of
always buying at the offer and selling at the bid, however, the
61
liquidity provider can break even. The spread simply needs to be
large enough between the bid and offer that the losses accrued by
transacting with informed traders are offset by the profits accrued
62
from transacting with uninformed investors.
Two useful ways exist of thinking about the calculations that
liquidity providers need to perform to survive in a competitive
market. The first, sometimes referred to as the “accounting
63
perspective,” is based on the proposition that for a liquidity supplier
to survive in business, what it loses from transacting with the
informed traders must be offset by what it gains from transacting with
uninformed traders. The second, sometimes referred to as the
64
“information perspective,” relates to how a liquidity supplier
rationally should update its estimate of a stock’s value depending on
whether the next order to transact against its quotes is a buy or a sell.
65
Each of these two perspectives leads to the same bid-ask spread.
1. The accounting perspective. At a point in time, let P be the
market’s assessment of the value of a share of stock given current
information. If A and B are respectively the offer and bid, and the
market consists entirely of traders with no private information, then
the liquidity provider’s expected profits are (A – P) from buyers and
(P – B) from sellers. A liquidity provider receives A from an
uninformed buyer and gives up a share of stock worth, given current
information, P. Similarly, the liquidity provider pays out B to an
uninformed seller and receives a share of stock worth P.
Now suppose, however, that some traders in the market may be
informed. An informed trader’s private information leads to a

61. The term “break even” is used here to include an ordinary market return on capital
that would be considered “profit” from an accounting perspective.
62. It is possible for the market to break down so there is no trade. The smaller the portion
of trading attributable to uninformed traders, the bigger the spread needs to be to compensate
for the losses from the informed traders. But the bigger the spread, the fewer the uninformed
investors willing to tolerate the associated trading losses.
63. See HARRIS, supra note 18, at 320–21 (discussing the accounting and information
perspectives).
64. Id.
65. See generally Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 15.
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different, on average more accurate, appraisal of the stock’s value
than the market assessment of P. Informed traders will buy if their
appraisal of the stock value, V, exceeds A, the offer. They will sell if
their estimate of value, V, is below B, the bid. The liquidity supplier
knows that if a buyer is informed, its view of V will, on average, be
more accurate than the view of others in the market. Therefore the
liquidity supplier rationally expects that if it unknowingly sells at A to
a person who is informed, on average V is greater than A. It will
similarly expect that if it unknowingly buys at B from a person who is
informed, on average V is less than B. Hence, expected profits from
transactions with informed buyers are negative, as are profits from
transactions with informed sellers.
The final input to the calculation is the likelihood of informed
and uninformed traders. On average, buy and sell orders from
uninformed traders will be equal in number. If trading takes place on
the basis of positive private information, the informed traders will
submit buy orders but not sell orders.
A concrete example is useful here. Suppose that over the next
short interval of time the market knows there will be an
announcement. If it contains good news, the apparent value of the
stock will rise from $60.00 to $61.00. If it contains bad news, the
apparent value will instead fall to $59.00. To those without private
information, it is equally likely that the news will be good as that it
will be bad. Informed traders, however, know what the
announcement will be. One percent of the order flow is expected to
come from informed traders, who will buy if what they know is good
and sell if what they know is bad. The uninformed are equally likely
to buy or sell.
Then, the probability that a buy is from an informed trader is (.5
x .01) (the likelihood the information is positive multiplied by the
percentage of trades that will be informed), whereas the probability
that it is from an uninformed trader is (.99 x .5) (the percentage of
traders that are uninformed multiplied by the even chance they will
be buyers rather than sellers). Thus, for the offer quote not to be a
losing proposition, it must be at least as big as the A that solves:
(.5 x .01)(A – $61.00) + (.99 x .5)(A – $60) = 0
Solving this equation, A, the offer, must be $60.01. By the same
reasoning, for the bid quote not to be a losing proposition, it should
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be $59.99, that is, a spread of two cents in a competitive market of
66
liquidity suppliers.
2. The information perspective. The second way to view the
quoting problem is the following. A liquidity supplier knows it is
possible that the next marketable order that arrives will be from an
informed trader. The liquidity supplier knows that if the next
marketable order to arrive is a buy, it is possibly motivated by
positive private information and there is no chance it is motivated by
negative private information. Similarly, if the next order to arrive is a
sell, it is possibly motivated by negative private information and there
is no chance it is motivated by positive private information. Thus,
whichever is the kind of order next to arrive, its arrival will alter the
liquidity supplier’s estimate of the stock’s value: up if it is a buy order
and down if it is a sell order. The offer and the bid are set in advance
of knowing which it will be, with the offer being contingent on the
arriving order being a buy and the bid on it being a sell. Thus, when a
liquidity supplier is deciding on its offer price, it knows an informed
trader will only accept that offer if the information was positive, and
that acceptance would cause the liquidity supplier to revise its
estimate upward. So, for a transaction with a buy order to be regret
free, the liquidity supplier must set the offer to reflect this upward
revision in advance. The same logic applies for setting the bid: to be
regret free it must reflect the downward revision that would
67
accompany the arrival of a sell order.
3. The pattern of transaction prices in the presence of informed
trading.
This second approach highlights an important
characterization of rational liquidity provision in a market with
private information. Liquidity suppliers will be constantly updating
valuations in response to transactions. With a sufficient number of
trades, the market price will come to reflect private information. The
behavior of rational liquidity providers thus reflects a kind of
66. For expositional simplicity, we are ignoring here other determinants of the bid-ask
spread, including inventory costs and the marginal costs for the personnel and facilities
necessary to be in the liquidity supply business. See generally Ananth Madhavan, Market
Microstructure: A Survey, 2 J. FIN. MKTS. 205, 212–23 (2008) (discussing empirical studies of
various determinants and microstructure models generally). None of the other determinants
undermine the conclusions in this Article that flow from this analysis.
67. Using the example in the text and applying Bayes’ Rule leads to exactly the same
calculation of the bid and ask as was generated by the accounting perspective. See Glosten &
Milgrom, supra note 15, at 93–94.
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“invisible hand”: simply as a result of their efforts to avoid losses to
informed traders, liquidity providers are repeatedly revising their
quotes so they come to fully reflect informed traders’ information,
making stock prices genuinely informative. In our example, suppose
the news known by the informed traders is good. Over a period of
time, both marketable buy and marketable sell orders will arrive at
trading venues, but there will be more buys than sells. As a result,
although there will be ups and downs in the offers and bids as the
estimate of value moves up and down with the arrival of each buy and
sell order, the ups will predominate and the midpoint between the bid
and offer will trend upward toward $61. Similarly, if the news known
by the informed traders is bad, the midpoint will trend downward
toward $59. Empirical evidence strongly supports the results of these
adverse-selection models: analyses of intraday changes in quotes and
in the prices of executed transactions consistently show that they
68
respond to the pattern of buy and sell orders at the time.
IV. THE EVALUATIVE CRITERIA
Now that the reader has a basic understanding of how the new
stock market works, we can introduce the criteria with which we will
evaluate today’s most controversial market practices and which can
be used more generally to analyze stock market public policy issues.
The parties engaged in each of these controversial practices do so in a
competitive market on a repeated basis and the other actors in the
system generally take this fact into account in determining their own
actions. The question then is how the existence of the practice affects
the system as a whole in terms of its ultimate impact on the multiple
social goals that equity-trading markets are expected to serve and that
form the justificatory basis for regulation when the markets fall short.

68. See generally Kalok Chan, Y. Peter Chung & Herb Johnson, The Intraday Behavior of
Bid-Ask Spreads for NYSE Stocks and CBOE Options, 30 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
329, 334 (1995) (suggesting that adverse selection is an important determinant of the intraday
behavior of bid-ask spreads); Lawrence R. Glosten & Lawrence E. Harris, Estimating the
Components of the Bid-Ask Spread, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 123 (1988) (testing a model in which the
bid-ask spread is divided into an adverse-selection component and a transitory component due
to inventory costs, clearing costs, and other factors).
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A. Goals
A number of social goals animate discussion of secondary equity
69
markets and their regulation: (i) promoting the efficient allocation of
capital so it goes to the most promising new investment projects in
our economy; (ii) promoting the efficient operation of the economy’s
existing productive capacity; (iii) promoting the efficient allocation of
resources between current and future periods so as to best satisfy the
needs of firms seeking funds for real investments (trading the promise
of future dollars to obtain current dollars) and the needs of savers
seeking to forgo current consumption in order to enjoy future
consumption (trading current dollars to obtain the promise of future
dollars); (iv) promoting the efficient allocation among investors of the
risks associated with holding securities so that the volatility in the
cash flows generated by productive enterprises is borne by risk-averse
investors in a way that generates the least disutility; (v) fostering an
overall sense of fairness; (vi) economizing on the real resources
society devotes to the operation of the trading markets and to the
enforcement and compliance costs associated with their regulation;
and (vii) fostering innovation that over time can improve the capacity
of the system to serve these preceding goals.
Any particular practice in the market may, of course, have a
positive impact in terms of some of these seven goals and a negative
impact in terms of others. It is nevertheless desirable to structure the
market for the secondary trading of equities so no unnecessary tradeoffs occur—that is, so it satisfies each goal to the fullest extent
possible without compromising one or more others—and to identify
the nature of the remaining unavoidable trade-offs so intelligent
choices can be made.
B. Market Characteristics that Impact on These Goals
The stock market’s operations relate to these social goals in
complex ways that result from its interacting characteristics. The two
most important characteristics are share-price accuracy and liquidity.
The impact of any given practice on the goals above is most easily
evaluated through a two-step process, first assessing the effect of the
practice on each of these two market characteristics and then

69. In the primary market, stocks are purchased from the company issuing those stocks,
whereas in the secondary market, traders buy and sell stocks from each other. Stock exchanges
are fundamentally secondary markets.
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identifying the effect of the characteristic on the goals. For each of the
controversial practices, we also identify the wealth transfers it
predictably generates. We do this for two reasons. First, much of the
criticism of the modern stock market as “unfair” seems to pivot on its
perceived wealth-transfer effects. Second, because understanding how
a practice affects the wealth of various market participants is essential
to understanding how it affects their behavior, and consequently,
liquidity and price accuracy.
1. Share-price accuracy. Price accuracy relates to the accuracy
with which the market price of an issuer’s shares predicts the issuer’s
70
future cash flows. Because the price of any new share offering by a
publicly traded issuer will be determined largely by the price of its
already outstanding shares in the stock market, more accurate stock
market prices will lead to capital being more likely to go to the issuers
with the most promising new real investment projects. Share price
also influences the availability of new project funding from other
outside sources and the willingness of managers to use internal funds
for investment, and so greater price accuracy assists the efficient
71
allocation of capital in these other ways as well.
More generally, accurate share prices help reveal managers who
are performing poorly both in terms of their deployment of internal
funds for new investment projects (again assisting the efficient
allocation of capital), and in terms of their management of the issuer’s
current assets (assisting the efficient operation of the economy’s
72
existing productive capacity).
Over time, more accurate share prices today also likely lead to a
greater sense of fairness on the part of investors because they will
73
experience fewer negative surprises.

70. See HARRIS, supra note 18, at 206–14 (discussing the social benefits of accurate stock
prices).
71. Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237,
260–64 (2009).
72. Id. at 258–60.
73. In an efficient market, the market price, whether it is relatively accurate or inaccurate,
is an unbiased predictor of an issuer’s future cash flows. If it is inaccurate, it is just more likely to
be far off, one way or the other, from how things ultimately turn out. Thus, efficient, but
relatively inaccurate, prices would result in as many positive surprises as negative ones. To many
investors, however, the negative surprise is likely to be more salient. So, when a negative
surprise materializes, it generates a sense of grievance even though, ex ante, a positive surprise
was equally likely.
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2. Liquidity. A second characteristic is how liquid the market is.
Liquidity is a multidimensional concept that relates to the size of a
trade, the price at which it is accomplished, and the time it takes to
74
accomplish the trade. Generally, the larger the size of the purchase
or sale and the faster one wishes to accomplish it, the less desirable
will be the price. The more liquid the market is, however, the less
75
severe are these trade-offs. For a small retail purchase or sale of
stock, the spread between the NBO and the NBB is a good measure
of liquidity because the trader can effect the buy or sell transaction
immediately at those respective prices and, in essence, will be paying
half the spread to do so. For larger orders, how much is available at
prices not too inferior to the NBO or NBB (the “depth of the book”)
will become relevant as well.
Liquidity also has an impact on a number of social goals:
a. More efficient allocation of resources over time. To start, the
prospect of greater liquidity promotes more efficient allocation of
resources over time. Consider this first in terms of enterprises seeking
new capital to devote to real investment projects. In essence, they are
purchasers of current dollars in return for the promise of future
dollars. The more liquid an issuer’s shares are, the more valuable
their shares are to hold for any given level of expected future cash
76
flow. Thus, when an issuer offers shares in the primary market, the
more liquid investors anticipate the shares will be in the future, the
higher the price, all else equal, at which the issuer can sell its shares.
77
Hence, the lower the issuer’s cost of capital.
In welfare economics terms, just like a tax, illiquidity results in a
wedge between the value of what the savers (the purchasers of future
74. See HARRIS, supra note 18, at 394–410 (analyzing liquidity).
75. Id.
76. For a purchaser of the shares in the primary market—the sellers of current dollars in
return for the promise of receiving future dollars—more liquidity means it is less costly to sell
her shares in the future to provide for future consumption because the bid will be less below the
midpoint between the bid and the offer. In addition, more liquidity means that buyers in the
market at the time of this sale would value the shares more highly so that this midpoint will be
higher. This is because it is less expensive to buy the shares in the sense that the offer will be less
above the midpoint and again it will be less expensive for these buyers to sell at yet some further
point in the future because the bid then will be less below the midpoint.
77. The cost of capital is lower because the prospect of a smaller bid-ask spread results in
the same issuer’s expected future cash flow being discounted to present value at a lower
discount rate. See Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17
J. FIN. ECON. 223, 230 (1986); Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Liquidity and Asset Prices:
Financial Management Implications, 17 FIN. MGMT. 5, 6 (1988).
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dollars) expect to receive in the future and what the entrepreneurs or
issuers (the suppliers of future dollars in the form of future dividend
78
streams) expect to give up in the future. As a result, illiquidity
results in the less efficient allocation of resources over time. This
wedge prevents certain transactions from occurring that would have
occurred if the shares were expected to be more liquid. The fact that,
absent this wedge, the issuer and savers would have willingly entered
into these transactions means the transactions prevented by illiquidity
are ones that would have made both parties better off on an expected
basis. These lost transactions are projects with expected returns that
are lower than the marginal project that gets funded in a world with a
degree of illiquidity, but that nevertheless are high enough to make
some people feel that, absent liquidity concerns, sacrificing their
current dollars for the projects’ promises of future ones would be
79
worthwhile.
b. Greater share-price accuracy. More liquidity also lowers the
transaction costs associated with speculative trading based on
acquiring a variety of bits of publicly available information and
analyzing them to make more accurate predictions of an issuer’s cash
80
flows, that is, creating fundamental value information. Thus, it
stimulates such activity and in the process increases share-price
accuracy, with the attendant benefits in terms of more efficient capital
allocation and utilization of existing productive capacity discussed just
above.
c. More efficient allocation of risk. Greater liquidity also
81
promotes the more efficient allocation of risk. Constant change in
the world means that what constitutes an individual’s optimal
portfolio, in terms of diversification and of the individual’s relative
degree of risk aversion, is always shifting. By making both the
purchase and sale of securities less expensive, greater liquidity allows
the individual investor to cost-effectively adjust her portfolio over
time to keep it closer at each moment to what is optimal for her.

78. See THIERRY FOUCAULT, MARCO PAGANO & AILSA RÖELL, MARKET LIQUIDITY:
THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND POLICY 307 (2013) (discussing how illiquidity acts as a wedge
between transaction prices and the fundamental value of assets).
79. HARRIS, supra note 18, at 214–15.
80. See id. at 206–14 (discussing social value of liquidity).
81. Id.
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V. ANALYZING THE EIGHT MOST CONTROVERSIAL NEW STOCK
MARKET PRACTICES
The usefulness of our analytical framework for assessing the new
stock market can be demonstrated by its application to the new stock
market’s eight most controversial practices.
A. Electronic Front Running
So-called “electronic front running” involves a situation in which
an HFT, before others in the market, learns of a transaction that has
occurred at one exchange and alters its quotes on other exchanges
given the possibility that similar orders may still be in transit heading
toward other exchanges. The HFT races ahead of these orders still on
their way to the other exchanges and, before they arrive at their
82
destinations, changes its quotes on these other exchanges.
Electronic front running has been harshly criticized. For
example, Charlie Munger, vice chairman of Berkshire Hathaway, has
objected that high-frequency trading is “legalized front-running[,] . . .
83
and it should never have been able to reach the size that it did.”
Similarly, New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman has
complained that “[w]hen blinding speed is coupled with early access
to data, it gives small groups of traders the power to manipulate
market movements in their own favor before anyone else knows
84
what’s happening.” Flash Boys, published after these comments,
85
makes electronic front running its principal focus. Even more
82. See supra Part I.C.1. For fascinating empirical evidence suggesting that electronic front
running occurs, see Vincent van Kervel, Liquidity: What You See Is What You Get? 2–6 (May
2012) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Tilburg University), http://www.rsm.nl/fileadmin/home/
Department_of_Finance__VG5_/LQ5/VanKervel.pdf [http://perma.cc/RBX2-P9QP] (modeling
and gathering empirical evidence that transactions on venues are followed by limit order
cancellations on competing venues).
83. Sam Mamudi, Charlie Munger: HFT is Legalized Front-Running, BARRON’S: STOCKS
TO WATCH (May 3, 2013, 1:25 PM), http://blogs.barrons.com/stockstowatchtoday/2013/05/03/
charlie-munger-hft-is-legalized-front-running [http://perma.cc/NS8R-V7QN].
84. Linette Lopez, New York’s Attorney General Has Declared War on Cheating HighFrequency Traders, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 24, 2013, 2:41 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
schneiderman-targets-hft-front-running-2013-9 [http://perma.cc/EX85-TCH3].
85. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 2, at 108, 126, 172. Since the publication of the book in the
spring of 2014, a host of other commentators have chimed in with criticism equating electronic
front running with traditional illegal front running. See, e.g., Ellen Brown, Computerized Front
Running: Another Goldman-Dominated Fraud, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (June 26, 2010,
5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ellen-brown/computerized-front-runnin_b_548148.
html [http://perma.cc/X379-8R3P] (stating that electronic front running contributes to “the
manipulation of markets for economic and political ends”); Gene Marcial, High-Frequency
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recently, a prominent class-action suit was filed against all of the
nation’s exchanges that, in support of its claim of fraud, includes
allegations that the exchanges cooperated with HFTs in facilitating
86
electronic front running.
Substantively, all these criticisms focus on the fact that when an
HFT engages in an act of electronic front running, the HFT can be
expected to be better off and some other trader involved worse off. It
should be noted at the outset, however, that the HFT practice labeled
as “electronic front running” is distinctly different from the kind of
behavior that has traditionally been termed “front running.”
Traditional front running, which is clearly illegal, relates to a situation
involving a customer giving her broker an order to handle. Then the
broker, which has a legal duty to its customer not to use knowledge of
its customer’s order to its own advantage, breaches this duty by
engaging in a trade on its own behalf that executes ahead of the
87
customer’s order. In contrast, when an HFT engages in the practice
labeled as “electronic front running,” it has no preexisting
relationship with the trader placing the order that the HFT detects
and so no relationship between the two could give rise to a duty on
the part of the HFT akin to what a broker owes its customer. The
matter of whether rules should prevent HFTs from engaging in this
practice is of course an appropriate issue for policy analysis, as is

Trading Mainly Hurts the Traders and Short-Term Investors, FORBES (Apr. 2, 2014, 4:06 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/genemarcial/2014/04/02/high-frequency-trading-mainly-hurts-thetraders-and-short-term-investors [http://perma.cc/4DTH-SN7W] (stating that “front-running on
Wall Street, which is what high-frequency trading is all about and what it really intends to be, is
old news,” and arguing that only the speed with which HFTs front run other investors is new).
86. Amended Complaint at 26, City of Providence v. BATS Global Mkts., Inc., No. 14-cv2811-SMF (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2014).
87. Traditional front running is prohibited under the common law, federal law, and
industry self-regulatory standards. See Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668, 676
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff’d, 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding front running to be illegal under
principles of agency and federal law). The SEC prosecutes front running as a violation of
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-(5). See, e.g., Complaint at 13, SEC v. Bergin,
2015 WL 4275509 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2013) (No. 3:13-cv-1940), 2013 WL 2400793 (charging
trader for front running clients under Section 10(b)); see also Concept Release on Equity
Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 61,358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3609 (proposed Jan. 14,
2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242) (discussing the illegality of front running). FINRA
Rule 5270(a) prohibits trading in a security if an individual has “material, non-public market
information concerning [a customer’s] imminent block transaction in that security,” until that
block transaction has become public. FINRA Rules, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., at Rule
5270 [hereinafter FINRA Rules], http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_viewall.html?
rbid=2403&element_id=607&record_id=609&filtered_tag= [http://perma.cc/78SE-RWUZ] (last
amended Sept. 3, 2013).
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being undertaken here. It is important to note, however, that the
practice involves no breach of duty or mutually-agreed-upon terms
between contracting parties, nor does it involve any obvious breach
by HFTs of the federal anti-fraud laws.
1. An example. We will examine the practice of electronic front
running through use of an example. For simplicity of exposition, just
one HFT, Lightning, and two exchanges, BATS Y and NASDAQ, are
involved. Lightning has co-location facilities at the respective
locations of the BATS Y and NASDAQ matching engines. A highspeed fiber-optic cable connects these co-location facilities with each
88
other.
An actively managed institutional investor, Smartmoney, decides
that Amgen’s future cash flows are going to be greater than its
current price suggests. The NBO is $148.00, with 10,000 shares being
offered at this price on BATS Y and 35,000 shares at this price on
NASDAQ. Smartmoney decides to buy a substantial block of Amgen
stock and sends a 10,000 share market buy order to BATS Y and a
89
35,000 share market buy order to NYSE. The 35,000 shares offered
at $148.00 on NASDAQ are all from sell limit orders posted by
Lightning.
The order sent to BATS Y arrives at its destination first and
executes. Lightning’s co-location facility there learns of the
transaction very quickly. An algorithm infers from this information
that an informed trader might be looking to buy a large number of
Amgen shares and thus may have sent buy orders to other exchanges
as well. Because of Lightning’s ultra-high-speed connection, it has the
ability to send a message from its BATS Y co-location facility to its
co-location facility at NASDAQ, which in turn has the ability to
cancel Lightning’s 35,000 share $148.00 limit sell order posted on
NASDAQ. All this can happen so fast that the cancellation would
occur before the arrival there of Smartmoney’s market buy order. If

88. See supra Parts I.A and I.C for a discussion of exchange matching engines and HFT colocation facilities.
89. This example fleshes out the story by Michael Lewis of how electronic front running
could occur with Amgen stock in such a situation. LEWIS, supra note 2, at 33–34. Lewis asserts
that the HFT could profit at the expense of others by cancelling its quotes on another exchange,
but he does not discuss exactly why it would be profitable for the HFT to do so. Nor does he
analyze how the quotes initially available might be different if the practice of electronic front
running were eliminated. The discussion that follows fills in these holes.
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Lightning does cancel in this fashion, it has engaged in electronic
front running.
Why might Lightning wish to cancel its sell limit order on
NASDAQ? One possibility is that given its inference that a large
market buy order is likely soon to arrive at NASDAQ, Lightning
wishes to submit, in place of its cancelled order, a new sell limit order
for the same number of shares at a higher price, say at $148.02. If
Lightning does so and Smartmoney’s buy order executes against this
new higher quote, the HFT will be better off, and Smartmoney worse
off, by $.02 per share.
Note though, that the HFT will be able to improve its position in
this way only if the NASDAQ limit order book has room so that the
$148.02 offer price is still more attractive to potential buyers than any
other offers with respect to Amgen already posted on NASDAQ.
Suppose, for example, that prior to Lightning’s cancellation, the next
best offer on NASDAQ was 15,000 shares at $148.01 and the best
offer after that was 20,000 shares at $148.02. The price- and timepriority rules would mean that Smartmoney’s buy order would
execute against these other two standing offers, not against any new
$148.02 offer by Lightning.
This cautionary note, though, hides a more critical point:
Lightning may wish to cancel its $148.00 sell limit order even if in fact
the book contains no room to improve its position by selling to
Smartmoney at a higher price. Recall that to survive in a competitive
market, a market maker like Lightning must set its quotes
aggressively enough to attract business, but not so aggressively that
the money it makes by buying from, and selling to, uninformed
traders is less than what it loses by engaging in such transactions with
informed traders. At the time it posted its sell limit order, Lightning
calculated $148.00 as the optimal price for an offer of 35,000 shares,
based on what it knew then about the likelihood of the existence of
positive private information. Now, however, Lightning knows
something more: a large buy order has transacted on BATS Y. This
will cause Lightning to revise upward its assessment of the likelihood
that private information suggests that the value of a security is higher
than the market previously thought. The upward revision is very
possibly great enough that $148.00 is no longer the optimal price at
which to offer to sell shares. In that case, Lightning will be better off
cancelling its $148.00 limit offer on NASDAQ.
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2. Wealth-transfer considerations. To see the distributive effects
of electronic front running, we need to consider how the world would
differ if the practice were eliminated. As a first cut for this discussion
of the practice’s wealth effects, and for the discussion below of its
efficiency effects, we will make the assumption, later relaxed, that
only three kinds of market participants exist: HFTs, informed traders
who trade on the basis of fundamental value information, and
90
uninformed traders.
a. Electronic front running narrows spreads. As the analysis of
the example makes clear, the practice of electronic front running by
HFTs makes orders by large purchasers and sellers somewhat less
anonymous in the sense that the practice allows HFTs to better detect
the possibility that informed market orders are headed for their limit
orders. If HFTs did not have the ability to learn these things and alter
their standing limit orders accordingly, they would know that a larger
percentage of the trades that will execute against their limit orders
will come from informed traders. The primary cost of being a liquidity
supplier—the losses incurred from dealing with informed traders—
would therefore go up. Accordingly, HFTs would increase their
initially posted spreads to compensate.
Going back to our example, if Lightning were not able to
electronically front run, it might have initially posted its limit sell
order for 35,000 shares at $148.01 instead of $148.00. For the same
reasons, it would also have a lower bid. So if, with electronic front
running being allowed, its bid would have been $147.96, without the
practice its bid might instead have been $147.95.
b. Electronic front running helps uninformed investors and hurts
informed investors. If electronic front running were eliminated,
uninformed traders and informed traders will each suffer from the
resulting larger spreads—the higher offers and lower bids—because
for both it will be more expensive to trade. For uninformed traders,
that is the end of the story. Informed traders, however, would get a
more-than-compensating benefit.
To see why, the starting point again is the fact that the
elimination of electronic front running would make it more difficult
90. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of the different types of private information. We
will revisit this discussion later with a more nuanced analysis that focuses on the fortunes of
each of the three kinds of informed traders: fundamental value information traders,
announcement traders, and inside-information traders. See infra Part V.A.4.
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for HFTs to detect indications of possible informed orders, and so
more informed trades would execute against their quotes. Trading is a
zero-sum game. Thus, if HFTs did not increase their spreads in
response to the end of the practice, the gains enjoyed by informed
investors would just equal the increased losses suffered by HFTs. In
fact, however, if electronic front running is eliminated, then HFTs will
increase their spreads. They will do so by an amount just sufficient to
91
cover what these losses would otherwise be. This is because, as we
learned in Part III, the economic pressures on HFTs operating in a
competitive market require them to set their spreads at a level such
that they just break even.
The increased spreads will be borne by all traders, informed and
uninformed alike, because the HFTs cannot condition their exchangeposted limit orders on the identity of the person who sends the
92
market orders against which their limit orders execute. This means
informed traders come out ahead: the gains they would have enjoyed
without the increase in spreads are not fully dissipated by the extra
they must pay because the spreads in fact are increased. The rest of
what HFTs need to break even comes from uninformed traders, who
must pay the increased spread too.
In sum, without electronic front running, HFTs would find it
harder to detect indications of possible trading on private information
and as a result would increase their spreads. Informed traders would
get all of the gains from being better able to hide the informed nature
of their trades. But they pay, through the increased spreads, only part
of the added costs incurred by HFTs as a result of entering into more
losing transactions. The rest of these added costs are borne by
uninformed investors, who receive no such benefit. So, electronic

91. For reasons of expository simplicity, this statement assumes that the increase in spreads
would not decrease the volume of trading. Therefore, it is assumed that the increase in the
absolute number of HFT trades with informed traders that would occur from the elimination of
electronic front running would be the same with the increase in spreads as without. In fact, an
increase in spreads makes trading more costly, suggesting that the volume would be lower with
the increase in spreads than without it. This simplification does not alter the basic logic of the
analysis in the text, however.
92. Regulation NMS Rule 610(a) precludes exchanges from restricting access to trading on
their facilities. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(2) (2012) (providing that “the rules of [a registered]
exchange [must] provide that any registered broker or dealer . . . may become a member of such
exchange”); 17 C.F.R. § 242.610(a) (2015) (prohibiting “national securities exchange[s]
[from] . . . prevent[ing] or inhibit[ing] any person from obtaining efficient access” to trading
against the buy and sell quotes posted on exchanges).
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front running benefits uninformed investors and harms informed
ones.
c. The ultimate incidence of electronic front running. Electronic
front running has been regularly attacked as harming “ordinary
93
investors.” Our analysis, however, suggests that this attack is
unmerited. To start, consider retail investors, the paradigmatic
ordinary investors. Retail investors generally lack any significant
private information and hence are properly assumed to be
uninformed. Uninformed investors, as we have just seen, are helped,
not hurt, by electronic front running.
Most of the persons whose money is invested in index-based
mutual funds and pension funds would also presumably count as
ordinary investors. These entities too, by definition, are uninformed
traders: their purchases and sales are not prompted by any kind of
private information. Rather they purchase all the stocks in the index
when they receive a net inflow of investor funds and sell all stocks in
the index when the volume of investor redemptions is sufficient to
result in a net outflow of funds. Again, electronic front running, by
narrowing spreads and reducing the cost of trading, helps, not hurts,
these funds and derivatively their ordinary investors.
What, though, about people who invest in managed mutual or
94
pension funds? They too are presumably mostly ordinary persons.
These entities do fundamental value research and thus have the
potential of being informed investors. The analysis above suggests
that electronic front running hurts informed investors. Though these
funds can be expected to enjoy gains from the elimination of
electronic front running, these gains might well not be passed on to
the ordinary people who invest in them. The investment industry and
those who work in it each appear to operate in fairly competitive
markets. To the extent that these markets are in fact competitive,
much of whatever above-market returns are generated by these
institutions’ informed trading will be captured in the form of higher

93. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 2, at 104; see also Amended Complaint at 93–95, City of
Providence v. BATS Global Mkts., Inc., No. 14-cv-2811-SMF (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2014).
94. See INV. CO. INST., 2013 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 90 (53d ed. 2013), http://
www.ici.org/pdf/2013_factbook.pdf [http://perma.cc/KWT6-JAN4] (stating that mutual funds
are primarily owned by individual investors). Indeed, it appears to be these particular ordinary
investors that Michael Lewis has in mind when arguing that electronic front running takes
money from ordinary folks on Main Street and gives it to HFTs. See LEWIS, supra note 2, at 81,
102, 108, 172.
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fees or salaries for the professionals who make the actual investment
95
decisions. This suggests that any gains in these entities’ trading
returns that might result from the elimination of electronic front
running are likely to go primarily to increase the fees and salaries of
the professionals who make the actual investment decisions, not to
the ordinary persons on whose behalf they trade. So even these
ordinary investors likely are not hurt by electronic front running.
The beneficiaries of electronic front running, according to the
96
critics of the practice, are the exchanges and the HFTs themselves.
Here, the critics are closer to the mark. An exchange charges HFTs
fees for permitting co-location: namely, the right to place the HFT’s
97
server very near the exchange’s matching engine. If electronic front
running were eliminated tomorrow, HFT co-location facilities would
be worth less to the HFTs and they might consequently not be willing
to pay as much in fees. This might reduce the rents collected by the
exchanges. Any such reduction in rents would hurt the exchanges, at
98
least in the short run. The exchange business, however, has become
much more competitive than in the past, making the exchanges’
99
longer-run ability to collect rents questionable. In the longer run, the
revenues of firms in a competitive industry can be expected to just
equal their costs, including an ordinary market return on capital.
Thus, to the extent that the exchange business has in fact become
competitive, any revenues lost from co-location fees would eventually
need to be made up through higher charges to investors who trade on
the exchange.

95. Jonathan B. Berk & Richard C. Green, Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in
Rational Markets, 112 J. POL. ECON. 1269, 1271 (2004).
96. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 2, at 126, 176; see also Amended Complaint at 6, 26, 93–97,
City of Providence, No. 14-cv-2811-SMF (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2014).
97. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE, NYSE PRICE LIST 2015, at 18–20, https://www.nyse.
com/publicdocs/nyse/markets/nyse/NYSE_Price_List.pdf [http://perma.cc/GGB9-VYSU]
(defining co-location fees).
98. The impact of eliminating any of these practices, however, is uncertain because HFTs
desire co-location for a number of reasons. See Charles M. Jones, What Do We Know About
High-Frequency Trading 10, 26 (Columbia Bus. Sch. Research Paper, Paper No. 13-11, 2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2236201 [http://perma.cc/EC79-K4UR]
(discussing that HFTs seek co-location to minimize their latency in learning of quote changes
and in altering their quotes and analyzing empirical evidence that the introduction of colocation improves liquidity). If sophisticated investors extensively use co-location and smart
routers, it could also reduce, or possibly eliminate, the incidence of electronic front-running.
99. Nu Ri Jung, The Present and Future of the Financial Services Industry: Convergence,
Consolidation, Conglomeration, and Collaboration, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 729, 740 (2011)
(describing competitive pressures driving changes in stock exchanges).
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Similarly, the lower volume of HFT business that would result
from the elimination of electronic front running would reduce the
profits of firms now in the HFT business and thus lower the value of
their existing assets. But in the longer-run future, investments in the
industry can be expected to earn a competitive return, with or without
the practice. Persons with abilities and skills that are uniquely
valuable to the business of HFTs would, however, suffer both a shortand longer-term diminution in their wealth positions from its
elimination.
3. Efficiency considerations. Elimination of electronic front
running would have three effects in terms of the efficient operation of
the economy, two of which would appear to be efficiency enhancing
and one efficiency diminishing.
a. Improved share price accuracy. We have just seen that
informed traders would be net gainers from the elimination of
electronic front running. Their cost of trading would go up from the
increase in spreads, but this would be more than compensated for by
the more advantageous trades they can make with HFTs because of
the reduced ability of HFTs to detect indications of possible informed
trading. In the simplified world we are analyzing in this first cut at the
problem, the only informed traders are persons who trade on
fundamental value information. These are the speculative investors
who make money by searching out bits of publicly available
information, analyzing what has been gathered in a sophisticated way,
and coming up with a superior estimate of a share issuer’s future cash
flows than is implied by the current market price of its shares. Hedge
funds, actively managed mutual funds, pension funds, and
endowments of nonprofits are examples of such informed traders.
Because these informed traders buy when their superior estimate
of share value suggests that a stock is underpriced and sell when it
indicates a stock is overpriced, their activities make share prices more
accurate. The elimination of electronic front running would make it
more profitable for these traders to engage in their activity and so
they will do more of it. As a result, prices will be more accurate. As
we have seen, more accurate prices benefit the economy by helping to
allocate the economy’s scarce capital to the most promising potential
real investment projects and by improving the utilization of the
economy’s existing productive capacity through optimizing the signals
provided to management about investment decisions and the signals
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given to boards and shareholders about the quality of management
100
decisions.
b. Reduced resources going to HFT activities. The second
positive effect from eliminating electronic front running relates to the
productive resources that are currently being devoted to undertaking
the practice, including the skills and abilities of highly sophisticated
technical personnel, advanced computers, and fiber-optic networks.
Though HFTs are notoriously secretive, HFT Virtu Financial, Inc.
(Virtu) did make certain public disclosures in the run up to its now101
postponed IPO.
In 2013 alone, Virtu reported spending
approximately $65 million on communication and data processing and
102
$78 million on employee compensation and payroll taxes. Because
Virtu has only 151 employees, this means they pay an average salary
103
of about $517,000. Virtu is just one of several large HFTs and there
104
are many smaller ones as well. With infrastructure and human
capital no longer needed to support electronic front running, they
would be freed up to increase other productive activities in the
economy.
c. Allocation of resources over time and allocation of risk. The
elimination of electronic front running, by widening spreads, would
make the market for equities less liquid. This has an unambiguously
negative effect on the efficient allocation of resources over time. As
we have seen, the prospect that an issuer’s shares will have less
100. See supra Part IV.B.1. Implicit in this analysis is that the improvements in the real
economy from more accurate prices in terms of better capital allocation and better utilization of
the economy’s existing productive capacity are greater than the value of the additional real
resources that are brought to the task of gathering and analyzing bits of publicly available
information. Ample empirical evidence suggests that accurate price signals do in fact have
efficiency-enhancing effects on managerial decisions. See FOUCAULT ET AL., supra note 78, at
361–68 (collecting relevant empirical studies). Theory also suggests that accurate financial
information will often be underproduced due to its status as a public good. See, e.g., Alex
Edmans, Itay Goldstein & Wei Jiang, The Real Effects of Financial Markets: The Impact of
Prices on Takeovers, 67 J. FIN. 933, 938 n.6 (2012).
101. See Virtu Financial, Inc., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933
(Form S-1) (Mar. 10, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1592386/000104746914
002070/a2218589zs-1.htm [http://perma.cc/F38S-CC2D].
102. Id. at 73.
103. Id. at 73, 105.
104. John McCrank, Exclusive: SEC Targets 10 Firms in High Frequency Trading Probe—
SEC Document, REUTERS (July 17, 2014, 5:19 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/17/
us-sec-investigation-highfrequencytradin-idUSKBN0FM2TW20140717 [http://perma.cc/67AZHX5D] (discussing some of the largest high-frequency trading firms).
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liquidity in the secondary trading market increases the issuer’s cost of
capital. Just like a tax, illiquidity results in a wedge between the value
of what the savers (the purchasers of future dollars) expect to receive
in the future and what the entrepreneurs or issuers (the suppliers of
future dollars in the form of future dividend streams) expect to give
up in the future. This blocks transactions that both parties would
otherwise have found advantageous if the market for the stock was
105
expected to be more liquid, and hence diminishes economic welfare.
Less liquidity would similarly have an unambiguously negative
effect on the efficient allocation of risk. The greater transaction costs
deter each investor from adjusting as finely her portfolio when
circumstances alter what would be optimal in terms of diversification
and suitability to her risk preferences.
4. Taking other kinds of informed traders into account. The
preceding discussion assumes that the only informed traders are ones
trading on the basis of fundamental value information. In fact, we
know of two other types of private information that can give a trader
a significant advantage: announcement information and inside
information. Taking account of these additional kinds of private
information does not change the conclusions above that electronic
front running has positive effects on uninformed investors as well as
on the efficiency with which risk is allocated and resources are
allocated over time, nor does it alter the fact that electronic front
running has negative social effects in terms of the real resources it
consumes. It also does not change the conclusion that it has a
negative impact on informed traders as a group. But, depending on
one’s assessment of the parameters involved, taking account of these
additional kinds of private information may well change the
conclusion above concerning the impact of electronic front running
on fundamental-value-information traders and hence of the practice’s
impact on price accuracy.
The issue is as follows. Suppose that electronic front running is
much more helpful at enabling liquidity suppliers to respond to
trading based on announcement information and inside information
than to trading based on fundamental value information. Suppose as
well that trading on the basis of these other two kinds of information
constitutes a large portion of all informed trading. Then traders
informed by these other two types of information will enjoy most of
105. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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the increased trading gains from the elimination of the practice. If
electronic front running were eliminated, HFTs would need to
increase spreads sufficiently to cover their corresponding increased
trading losses, most of which would be due to inside-information and
announcement-information traders. With the elimination of
electronic front running, fundamental-value-information traders will
thus have to pay as much extra per trade from the increased spread as
traders on the other two kinds of private information, but will only
get a small portion of the additional trading gains. It is thus quite
possible that fundamental-value-information traders will gain less
than they pay in increased spread and thus will be hurt by the
elimination of the practice.
A key factor in determining the likelihood of this possibility is
the susceptibility of fundamental-value-information trading to
detection by electronic front running relative to that of trading on the
basis of the other two kinds of private information. Announcementinformation traders are particularly susceptible because they need to
do all of their trading in a very short period of time. They therefore
need to engage in larger transactions, which are easier for HFTs to
detect and to which it is easier for HFTs to react. Fundamental-value
traders, in contrast, may often have days to complete their planned
purchases or sales and can break the total amount they wish to
transact into small packets that look more like the trades of
uninformed traders. But we would need to know much more to
resolve the question definitively. Existing empirical research is not
very enlightening concerning several other important factors: the
proportion of informed trades based on each of the three kinds of
private information, the average value of the information associated
with each, and the exact sensitivity of the trading patterns associated
with each of the three kinds of informed traders to detection by
electronic front running.
If further empirical research ultimately suggests that electronic
front running actually helps, not hurts, fundamental-valueinformation trading, it would suggest that the practice, contrary to our
earlier analysis, actually helps share-price accuracy by making the
business of fundamental-value-information trading more rewarding.
In contrast, announcement-information trading is not important in
terms of the social benefits that are derived from share-price accuracy
because the information will be reflected in price very quickly even
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without the trading. Inside-information trading is likely not socially
106
useful either.
B. Slow-Market Arbitrage
Slow-market arbitrage can occur when an HFT has posted a
quote representing the NBO or NBB on one exchange, and
subsequently someone else posts an even better quote on a second
exchange, which the HFT learns of before it is reported by the
national system. If, in the short time before the national report
updates, a marketable order arrives at the first exchange, the order
will transact against the HFT’s now-stale quote. The HFT, using its
speed, can then make a riskless profit by turning around and
107
transacting against the better quote on the second exchange.
108
Slow-market arbitrage was a target of criticism in Flash Boys,
which in turn reflected growing discontent among commentators in
109
the years preceding the book’s publication. The practice has also
formed a basis for litigation. For example, in the City of Providence’s
class action against all the exchanges for their cooperation with HFTs,
the complaint alleges that HFTs engaged in slow-market arbitrage

106. Persons trading on the basis of confidential nonpublic information neither worked to
develop the information, nor paid someone else to work to develop it. Whether these trades are
legal or not depends on the circumstances, but legality aside, the gain the trader enjoys at the
expense of other investors would be hard to justify as representing a socially useful incentive.
Such information usually becomes public relatively quickly and thus would have been reflected
in price soon anyway. Yet, as we have seen, the existence of the practice of trading on its basis
decreases liquidity, which discourages the activities of those who trade on the basis of
information that does take work to develop. So, on a net basis, trading on the basis of nonpublic
confidential information that took no work to develop is, if anything, likely to be socially
harmful. See Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Insider Trading and the Efficiency of
Stock Prices, 23 RAND J. ECON. 106, 110 (1992); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On
Insider Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229,
1238–43 (2001).
107. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 2, at 172 (depicting an example of putative slow-market
arbitrage).
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Tyler Durden, “Do It Yourself” Latency Arbitrage: How HFTs Can
Manipulate the NBBO at Whim Courtesy of NYSE Empty Quote Gluts, ZEROHEDGE (Aug. 23,
2010, 9:29 AM), http://www.zerohedge.com/article/do-it-yourself-latency-arbitrage-how-hftscan-manipulate-nbbo-whim-courtesy-nyse-quote-stuff [http://perma.cc/G858-EM6F]; Latency
On Demand?, NANEX (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.nanex.net/FlashCrash/FlashCrashAnalysis_
LOD.html [http://perma.cc/AD2Y-3Q9G] (discussing discrepancies between NYSE quotes in
the public quotation system and its private feeds and the potentially manipulative gaming of
those feeds by HFTs).
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and claims the practice “generate[d] billions of dollars more a year in
110
illicit profits than front-running.”
1. An example. To understand the practice in more detail, let us
return to our HFT Lightning. Suppose that Lightning has a limit sell
order for 1,000 shares of IBM at $161.15 posted on NYSE. This quote
represents the NBO at the moment. Mr. Lowprice then posts a new
1,000-share sell limit order for IBM on EDGE for $161.13.
The national reporting system is a bit slow, and so a short period
of time elapses before it reports Lowprice’s new, better offer.
Lightning’s co-location facility at EDGE very quickly learns of the
new $161.13 offer, however, and an algorithm sends an ultra-fast
message to Lightning’s co-location facility at NYSE informing it of
the new offer. During the reporting gap, though, Lightning keeps
posted its $161.15 offer. Next, Ms. Stumble sends a marketable buy
order to NYSE for 1,000 IBM shares. Lightning’s $161.15 offer
remains the official NBO, and so Stumble’s order transacts against it.
Lightning’s co-location facility at NYSE then sends an ultra-fast
message to the one at EDGE instructing it to submit a 1,000-share
marketable buy order there. This buy order transacts against
Lowprice’s $161.13 offer. Thus, within the short period before the
new $161.13 offer is publicly reported, Lightning has been able to sell
1,000 IBM shares at $161.15 and purchase them at $161.13, for what
appears to be a $20.00 profit.
It is worth noting that the first step in this story—Lowprice’s
posting of the $161.13 offer on EDGE—does not guarantee that
Lightning can make this profit. No marketable buy order may arrive
at NYSE during the reporting gap. Also, even if one does, by the time
Lightning is able to submit its marketable buy order at EDGE, some
other person may already have submitted a buy marketable order to
EDGE that picks off the $161.13 offer. This becomes particularly
likely if, as is the case in the real world, there are a number of HFTs
besides Lightning with co-location facilities at EDGE and at the other
exchanges. Depending on the nature of their own respective offers
posted on various exchanges, one or more of these other HFTs may
be competing with Lightning to pick off the one $161.13 offer.

110. Amended Complaint at 6, City of Providence v. BATS Global Mkts., Inc., No. 14-cv2811-SMF (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2014).
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2. Wealth-transfer effects. Who is helped and who is hurt in the
example above and what are the larger distributive consequences
with slow-market arbitrage as an ongoing practice? In the example,
the first thing to note is that Ms. Stumble, the person who, during the
reporting gap, submits the marketable order that transacts against
Lightning’s stale $161.15 offer, is not harmed by Lightning’s slowmarket arbitrage activities. Stumble would have suffered the same
fate if Lightning had not engaged in slow-market arbitrage because
that course of action would have also left the $161.15 offer posted on
NYSE and so Stumble’s buy order would still have transacted against
it.
Still, someone must be worse off: Lightning is better off than if it
had not engaged in the slow-market arbitrage, and trading is a zerosum game. To see who this worse-off person might be, consider first
why Lightning is better off. Lightning is in the business of buying and
selling shares, not holding on to long or short positions for any
significant period of time. So it needs to reverse quickly each
transaction it enters. Here, it sold shares when Stumble’s order
transacted against Lightning’s $161.15 offer on NYSE. To reverse this
transaction, Lightning needed to buy shares. By engaging in slowmarket arbitrage, it did so by seizing the best offer in the market—
Lowprice’s $161.13 offer on EDGE—before others in the market
even knew the offer was available. If Lightning had not detected this
new offer ahead of others and seized it, Lightning’s reversal of the
situation would occur through posting a bid that a marketable order
transacts against. We know from Part III that the sale of the shares at
$161.15 and their repurchase at this newly posted bid would each, on
an expected basis, be a break-even transaction. By successfully
engaging in slow-market arbitrage, Lightning instead made a certain
$.02 profit per share sold and purchased.
To figure out who is hurt from Lightning engaging in slowmarket arbitrage—that is, detecting the $161.13 offer and seizing it—
consider who would have been better off if Lightning had posted a
new buy limit order instead of seizing Lowprice’s $161.13 offer. The
person or persons helped would come from one of two groups of
potential liquidity takers. One group is potential sellers who submit
marketable sell orders: the posted bid that Lightning would need
filled would improve the terms for the marginal seller. The other
group is potential buyers who submit marketable buy orders: the
opportunity by members of this group to seize Lowprice’s $161.13

FOX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

THE NEW STOCK MARKET

11/2/2015 1:17 PM

241

offer, which was better than anything else available in the market at
the time, would improve terms for the marginal buyer.
The results from this example can be generalized. The persons
who are hurt by HFTs engaging in the practice of slow-market
arbitrage on an ongoing basis are regular traders, both informed and
111
uninformed ones. In contrast to electronic front running, in which
the practice decreases the effective cost of trading for uninformed
traders but increases it for informed traders, slow-market arbitrage
increases the effective cost of trading for all regular traders.
3. Efficiency considerations.
In most situations, arbitrage
activities, at least if they do not consume any real resources, have
positive economic-welfare effects. The actions of arbitrageurs
equilibrate prices in two markets, each of which has its own group of
potential participants, and as a result, presumptively welfareenhancing transactions are entered into that otherwise would not
112
have occurred. However, as the example shows, slow-market
arbitrage has little in common with ordinary arbitrage. Slow-market
arbitrage adds a third party, the liquidity supplier, whose only social
purpose is to facilitate trades between regular traders but who instead
is the only gainer from the so-called arbitrage activity. Regular
traders, both informed and uninformed, are in fact losers because
their cost of trading goes up. So the normal presumption in favor of
activities carrying the label “arbitrage” does not apply here.
In fact, even if slow-market arbitrage consumed no real
resources, it would have an unambiguously negative impact on
welfare. Consider first the effect of the increased effective cost of
trading for informed traders. Slow-market arbitrage, by raising the
effective cost of trading for informed traders, makes it less rewarding

111. In the example, if Lightning did not engage in slow-market arbitrage, it is possible that
it would be another HFT engaging in slow-market arbitrage, not an ordinary trader, who would
transact against the $161.13 offer. The ultimate question we are asking, however, is what would
happen if no HFT engaged in the practice.
112. The arbitrageurs do this by buying in the low-price market, thereby putting upward
pressure on the price there, and selling the same item in the high-price market, thereby putting
downward pressure on the price there. As a result, there is a group of potential sellers in the
initially low-price market who would not find it worthwhile to sell at the initial lower price, but
who do find it worthwhile to sell at the higher equilibrating price. And there is a group of
potential buyers in the initially high-price market that are in the exact mirror image situation.
The transactions entered into by these two groups of people, which would not occur but for
arbitrage, are presumptively welfare enhancing because they are entered into voluntarily by
both parties to each of the transactions.
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to seek out bits of publicly available information and to analyze their
implications in a sophisticated way. This reduces share-price accuracy,
which, as we have seen, would in turn have negative effects on the
allocation of capital for new real investment projects and the efficient
utilization of existing productive capacity. As for the increased
effective cost of trading on uninformed traders, it has the nowfamiliar negative effects on the efficient allocation of resources over
113
time and on the efficient allocation of risk.
Slow-market arbitrage in fact does consume real resources,
which is another efficiency consideration. If it were the only HFT
practice dependent on co-location facilities and ultra-fast connections,
it would use substantial amounts of real resources that could
otherwise be usefully employed increasing the production of other
goods and services. If HFTs were to continue the practice of
electronic front running, however, the marginal cost in real resources
of engaging in slow-market arbitrage as well is probably fairly low.
C. HFT Exploitation of Midpoint Orders
A trader will often submit to a dark pool a “midpoint” limit buy
or sell order, the terms of which are that it will execute against the
next marketable order with the opposite interest to arrive at the pool
and will do so at a price equal to the midpoint between the best
114
publicly reported bid and offer at the time of execution. Midpoint
orders appear to have the advantage of allowing a buyer to buy at
well below the best offer and sell well above the best bid. It has been
noted for a number of years, however, that traders who post such
115
orders are vulnerable to the activities of HFTs, a point that was also
116
picked up in Flash Boys. Midpoint-order exploitation again involves
an HFT detecting an improvement in the best available bid or offer
on one of the exchanges before the new quote is publicly reported.
The HFT puts in an order to transact against the new improved
quote, and then sends an order reversing the transaction to a dark

113. See supra IV.B.2.
114. Robert P. Bartlett, III & Justin McCrary, Dark Trading at the Midpoint: Pricing Rules,
Order Flow and Price Discovery 5 (Feb. 12, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.stern.
nyu.edu/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2%20Bartlett%20and%20McCrary%20Shall%20
We%20Haggle.pdf [http://perma.cc/87G8-DFVB].
115. See, e.g., Alex Paley, Navigating the Dark Pool Landscape, in ACCESSING
FRAGMENTED LIQUIDITY 46 (2010), https://autobahn.db.com/microSite/docs/Navigating_Dark_
Pool_Landscape.pdf [http://perma.cc/8LC3-NVTA].
116. LEWIS, supra note 2, at 113–18.
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pool that contains midpoint limit orders with the opposite interest
that transact at a price equal to the midpoint between the now-stale
117
best publicly reported bid and offer.
1. An example. Let us bring back again our HFT, Lightning.
Suppose that the NBB and NBO for IBM are $161.11 and $161.15,
respectively, and each are for 1,000 shares and are posted on NYSE
by HFTs other than Lightning. Then the $161.15 offer is cancelled
and a new 1,000-share offer is submitted at $161.12. Lightning,
through its co-location facilities at NYSE, learns of these changes in
advance of their being publicly reported. During the reporting gap,
the official NBO remains $161.15.
Lightning knows that midpoint orders for IBM are often posted
on Opaque, a well-known dark pool, and Lightning programs its
algorithms accordingly. Because Opaque does not disclose what is in
its limit order book, Lightning cannot know, however, whether at this
moment any such orders are posted on Opaque, and, if there are,
whether they are buy orders or sell orders. Still Lightning has a
chance to make money.
Using an ultra-fast connection between the co-location facility at
NYSE and Opaque, a sell limit order for 1,000 shares at $161.13 is
sent to Opaque with the condition attached that it cancel if it does not
transact immediately (a so-called “IOC” order). This way, if there
was at least one midpoint buy limit order posted at Opaque for IBM,
it will execute against Lightning’s order at $161.13, halfway between
the now-stale, but still official, NBB of $161.11 and NBO of $161.15.
If there are no such midpoint buy orders posted at Opaque, nothing is
lost.
Assume that at least one such midpoint buy order exists
aggregating to at least 1,000 shares so that Lightning’s sell order of
1,000 shares transacts at $161.13. Lightning’s co-location facility at
NYSE is informed of this fact through Lightning’s ultra-fast
connection with Opaque. A marketable buy order for 1,000 shares is
sent almost instantaneously to NYSE, which transacts against the new
$161.12 offer. Thus, within the short period before the new $161.12
offer on NYSE is publicly reported, Lightning has been able to
execute against this offer, purchase 1,000 IBM shares at $161.12, and
sell them at $161.13, for what appears to be a $10.00 profit.

117. See supra Part I.C.3.
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2. Wealth-transfer and efficiency considerations. The regular
practice of HFT exploitation of dark pool midpoint orders provides
rents to HFTs—they are able to make profitable trades they
otherwise would not be able to do. This activity yields no prosocial
incentive effect because it is unrelated to the positive social function
we have attributed to HFTs: providing liquidity in a world with both
uninformed and informed traders. Because trading is a zero-sum
game, if the HFTs gain, certain regular traders must lose. Because of
the practice, the expected cost of trading using midpoint orders in a
dark pool goes up. This would hurt those who are deterred from using
dark pool midpoint orders because of this higher cost of trading, as
well as those who still do use them but have to incur these higher
costs.
The efficiency effects of the practice closely resemble the
efficiency effects of the abuses by investment banks and dark-pool
118
operators that are the subject of later discussion. Suffice it to say
here, dark pools are a place for uninformed traders to lower their cost
of trading by finding other uninformed traders with which to trade.
Midpoint exploitation undermines their ability to do this at least to
some extent. The practice increases the effective cost of trading for
those uninformed traders who use dark pools. This hurts not only
those who use dark pools despite the higher effective cost of trading
but also those who would have used them but for this higher cost. For
the same reasons as discussed with respect to the earlier practices, this
will reduce the efficiency of both the allocation of resources over time
and the allocation of risk in the economy. At the same time, as
discussed more fully below, to the extent that the practice steers more
uninformed traders to trade in the exchanges, it leads to a narrowing
of spreads on the exchanges, thereby reducing the cost of
fundamental value information trading and thus improving shareprice accuracy.
D. High-Frequency Trading and Volatility
Though much of the controversy about high-frequency traders
has focused on their trading strategies, a different, but also important,
strain of criticism has alleged a causal connection between HFT
119
activity and greater volatility in equity markets.
118. See infra Part V.E.
119. See, e.g., Bob Dannhauser, Debating Michael Lewis’ ‘Flash Boys’: High-Frequency
Trading Not All Bad, SEEKING ALPHA (Apr. 7, 2014, 11:42 AM), http://seekingalpha.com/
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1. General increase in volatility. One criticism is that HFTs have
made the markets more volatile on an ongoing basis month in and
month out. Michael Lewis, in Flash Boys, for example, asserts that
the intraday price volatility of the stock market was 40 percent
greater between 2010 and 2013 than it was between 2004 and 2006,
and associates this change with the enactment of Regulation NMS
120
and the rise of HFTs.
Lewis’s use of this comparison to draw an inference about HFTs’
influence on volatility seems deeply mistaken. One big problem is
that the years 2004–2006 are a poor comparison sample because they
had uncharacteristically low volatility, below any other two-year
121
period from 1998 to 2012. Another big problem is that the years
2010–2013 are also uncharacteristic, as they followed the most severe
financial crisis since the Great Depression and would be expected to
show high volatility due to the increased uncertainty associated with
122
the fundamental values of securities. A better comparison sample
would be 2012 to the present, which shows market volatility that is
generally lower than the 1990s and early 2000s, despite the greatly
increased role of HFTs in the latter period. As one prominent article
has noted, current “[i]ntra-day volatility is below the levels of the pre123
electronic 1990s.” As best one can tell so far, no serious evidence
shows a causal link between the rise of HFTs and ongoing increased
volatility. HFTs rose to prominence during a period of greater
volatility, which was due to extraneous causes rather than the HFTs
themselves. In addition, no general theoretical reasons give rise to an
expectation of greater volatility due to HFT activity. Instead, the

article/2129253-debating-michael-lewis-flash-boys-high-frequency-trading-not-all-bad
[http://
perma.cc/R4K3-46YB] (describing flash crashes as “disconcerting and damaging to investor
trust”); Kit R. Roane, How NYSE Plans to Use ‘Flash Crash’ to Reclaim Its Glory, CNN
MONEY (May 12, 2010, 9:38 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/05/12/markets/NYSE_flash_crash.
fortune/index.htm [http://perma.cc/Z5GG-UT5X] (reporting attempts by NYSE executives to
connect HFTs with the flash crash).
120. LEWIS, supra note 2, at 112.
121. FABIO PANETTA, ET AL., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, THE RECENT BEHAVIOUR
OF FINANCIAL MARKET VOLATILITY 1 (2006), http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap29.pdf
[http://perma.cc/SX42-V3JF].
122. See ANGEL ET AL., supra note 29, at 11–12; see also John Y. Campbell, Martin Lettau,
Burton G. Malkiel & Yexiao Xu, Have Individual Stocks Become More Volatile? An Empirical
Exploration of Idiosyncratic Risk, 56 J. FIN. 1, 1 (2001) (finding significant spikes in volatility
during periods of major economic crisis).
123. ANGEL ET AL., supra note 29, at 2.
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majority of academic evidence on the subject suggests that HFTs
124
reduce volatility.
2. The Flash Crash. More interesting is a second claim: that
HFTs exacerbate volatility in a very extreme manner when there has
been some kind of disruption in the market, such as the infamous
May 6, 2010 “Flash Crash.” The Flash Crash occurred within a
window of less than thirty minutes during which the Dow Jones
Industrial Average (DJIA)—a benchmark of general market
performance—dropped about 1,000 points, losing 9 percent of its
125
value, and then recovered almost its entire loss. In this incident, the
126
DJIA suffered the greatest one-hour decline in its history, and
several individual stocks displayed astonishing volatility. Accenture,
for instance, fell from trading at $39.98 at 2:46 p.m. to one cent at 2:49
127
p.m., only to return to $39.51 by 2:50 p.m. Apple, as another
128
example, at one moment traded for almost $100,000 per share.
The Flash Crash was widely taken to “highlight[] the risks of
129
electronic trading” as NYSE’s then-head of operations suggested. In
124. See, e.g., Joel Hasbrouck & Gideon Saar, Low-Latency Trading, 16 J. FIN. MKTS. 646,
648 (2013) (finding that HFT activity reduces volatility); Jonathan Brogaard, Thibaut Moyaert
& Ryan Riordan, High Frequency Trading and Market Stability 1–2 (May 2014) (unpublished
manuscript), http://www.efmaefm.org/0EFMAMEETINGS/EFMA%20ANNUAL%20MEETI
NGS/2014-Rome/papers/EFMA2014_0242_fullpaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/DUG7-UQFT]. But
see Sandrine Jacob Leal, Mauro Napoletano, Andrea Roventini & Giorgio Fagiolo, Rock
Around the Clock: An Agent-Based Model of Low- and High-Frequency Trading 3 (Université
Nice Sophia Antipolis GREDEG Working Papers Series, Working Paper No. 2014-21, Jan.
2014), http://www.gredeg.cnrs.fr/working-papers/GREDEG-WP-2014-21.pdf [http://perma.cc/
UQF5-WYUW].
125. STAFFS OF THE CFTC & SEC, FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY
6, 2010, at 1 (2010) [hereinafter FLASH CRASH REPORT], http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/
marketevents-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/YC3Y-XTP8]; Alexandra Twin, Glitches Send Dow on
Wild Ride, CNN MONEY (May 6, 2010, 7:36 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/05/06/markets/
markets_newyork [http://perma.cc/KE3Y-Z272].
126. Tom Lauricella & Peter A. McKay, Dow Takes a Harrowing 1,010.14-Point Trip,
WALL ST. J. (May 7, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870437070
4575227754131412596 [http://perma.cc/VEN2-XA2H].
127. Id.
128. Tom Lauricella & Scott Patterson, Legacy of the ‘Flash Crash’: Enduring Worries of
Repeat, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274
8704545004575353443450790402 [http://perma.cc/2XXJ-MSLY]. Many of the most outlandish
transactions executed during the Flash Crash were later cancelled or “broken” by regulators.
See Brian Korm & Bryan Y.M. Tham, Why We Could Easily Have Another Flash Crash,
FORBES (Aug. 9, 2013, 7:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2013/08/09/whywe-could-easily-have-another-flash-crash [http://perma.cc/WXGA-XG8W].
129. Lauricella & McKay, supra note 126 (quoting Louis Pastina, executive vice president
and head of operations at NYSE Euronext’s New York Stock Exchange).
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the years since, blame has been persistently attributed to HFTs and
commentators have suggested that HFTs generally increase the
130
severity of market crashes. The report eventually issued by federal
regulators, however, explained the Flash Crash not as the result of
HFT predation, but as the result of a liquidity crisis caused by a large
sell order that triggered a flight of liquidity from the market. This
flight involved HFTs, but only in the sense that many HFTs are
market makers that left the market in response to the large sell
131
order.
This temporary disappearance of the HFTs removed
132
substantial liquidity.
The crucial question is: Why would a large market sell order
trigger a flight by HFTs, when the business of HFTs is to provide
liquidity to persons submitting marketable orders? The answer to this
question returns us to the overarching theme of this Article—that
comprehension and intelligent regulation of the modern stock market
is impossible without a thorough appreciation for the role of adverse
133
selection in shaping the provision of liquidity. Volatility of the kind
involved in the Flash Crash is directly connected to adverse selection.
The reason is that a large, aggressive sell (or buy) order suggests to
liquidity providers that the order submitter may have important
private information. HFTs know that if this apparent private
information in fact turns out to exist, then they will lose money from
134
trading with that order and so they will widen their spreads. If the
threat of being adversely selected by the order becomes extreme
enough, many or all liquidity providers will temporarily exit from the
market altogether and prices will, as a result, fluctuate widely in the
absence of quotes reflecting any plausible estimate of a security’s

130. See, e.g., Michael Ono, High Frequency Trading May Magnify Market Woes, ABC
NEWS (Aug. 11, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/high-frequency-trading-acceleratingmarket-woes/story?id=14280847 [http://perma.cc/44XN-Q68A] (suggesting that “computerdriven high frequency trading is partially responsible for accelerating stock gyrations”); Andrew
Smith, Fast Money: The Battle Against the High Frequency Traders, THE GUARDIAN (June 7,
2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jun/07/inside-murky-world-highfrequency-trading [http://perma.cc/4NY8-37HA].
131. Andrei A. Kirilenko, Albert S. Kyle, Mehrdad Samadi & Tugkan Tuzun, The Flash
Crash: The Impact of High Frequency Trading on an Electronic Market 25–26 (Sept. 24, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1686004 [http://
perma.cc/N8CQ-X82Z].
132. FLASH CRASH REPORT, supra note 125, at 6.
133. This Article focuses on HFTs as liquidity providers, and ample evidence shows that
they play this role. See, e.g., Menkveld, supra note 22, at 712.
134. See supra Part III.B.
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135

fundamental value. This, in essence, is what happened on a large
scale during the Flash Crash.
The behavior of HFTs during the Flash Crash was not predatory;
it was simply unheroic. Perceiving the large sell order to have a higher
probability of being motivated by private information, given its size
136
and aggressiveness, HFTs removed their quotes to minimize their
trading losses, and liquidated the long positions they had
137
accumulated, exacerbating pressures on price declines. Because
HFTs provide a large share of liquidity, in their absence, the only
quotes left lay far from the true price of a security; that is, the present
138
value of its future cash flows.
3. Wealth-transfer considerations. Assessing the wealth transfers
resulting from gyrations, such as in the Flash Crash, is equivalent to
asking who wins and loses when HFTs stop providing liquidity.
Despite suggestions by critics of predatory behavior, HFTs cannot
make money if they do not trade. Among traders, the losers are
persons who put in market sell orders for stocks that temporarily
went way down and market buy orders for stocks that temporarily
went way up. The winners were the persons who posted previously
way-out-of-the-money limit orders against which these market orders
transacted.
4. Efficiency considerations. Events such as the Flash Crash seem
bound to occur from time to time with an HFT-dominated system for
providing liquidity. The old NYSE specialist system, in which the
specialist was supposed to “lean against the wind” to provide liquidity
may have been less prone to such problems. So perhaps was the
dealer system more generally, in which human beings made the
trading decisions. These occasional brief moments of total collapse of
liquidity do not really seem very important in terms of our
touchstones for efficiency, however. Very brief sharp deviations of
share prices from fundamental values do not seriously undermine the
135. FLASH CRASH REPORT, supra note 125, at 2–3.
136. See David Easley, Marcos M. López de Prado & Maureen O’Hara, The Microstructure
of the ‘Flash Crash’: Flow Toxicity, Liquidity Crashes, and the Probability of Informed Trading,
37 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 118, 120–26 (2011) (suggesting that order flow was especially informed
and hence toxic for market makers in the period preceding the Flash Crash).
137. FLASH CRASH REPORT, supra note 125, at 29; see Jones, supra note 98, at 26.
138. FLASH CRASH REPORT, supra note 125, at 45–57; see FOUCAULT ET AL., supra note 78,
at 2 (discussing the “fundamental value” of a security as a market consensus about its
appropriate price).
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role of share prices in aiding the efficiency with which capital is
allocated to new real investment projects and with which existing
productive capacity is utilized. Accuracy most of the time is what
matters. And investors can protect themselves from extreme results
by using orders with limits that would appear to make them
marketable. They can stay briefly out of the market without seriously
undermining the efficient allocation of resources over time or the
efficient allocation of risk. The modern stock market’s overall
performance in terms of liquidity provision and operational costs is
far better than the market of the past, which matters more for the
ultimate social goals promoted by a well-functioning equity market.
E. Dark Pools and the Fate of Customer Orders
The next two controversial practices involve the fate of customer
139
orders that end up in dark pools. The first alleged practice involves
large investment banks, which are both important providers of
140
brokerage services and operators of most of the largest dark pools.
They are accused of routing their brokerage customers’ orders to the
banks’ own dark pools even when the orders will receive inferior
141
execution there. Related to this first practice is the claim that it is
common for a dark-pool operator to misrepresent the nature of other
parties’ trading in its pool in order to induce brokerage customers to
agree to have their orders sent to this pool.

139. See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper, As Market Heats Up, Trading Slips into Shadows, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2013, at B1; Shining a Light on Dark Pools, THE ECONOMIST: SCHUMPETER
(Aug. 18, 2011, 4:08 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2011/08/exchange-sharetrading [http://perma.cc/22EM-RGS7]; David Zeiler, How High-Frequency Traders Use Dark
Pools to Cheat Investors, MONEY MORNING (Apr. 22, 2014), http://moneymorning.com/2014/04/
22/how-high-frequency-traders-use-dark-pools-to-cheat-investors [http://perma.cc/V6LL-6VSX]
(discussing how HFTs may be abusing dark pool access).
140. An underlying premise of these criticisms is that the largest investment banks are also
among the most prominent brokers and dark-pool operators. For instance, Michael Lewis often
discusses dark pools as being operated by Wall Street banks, which is accurate—six of the ten
largest dark pools are run by major investment banks. See RHODRI PREECE, CFA INST., DARK
POOLS, INTERNALIZATION, AND EQUITY MARKET QUALITY 14–15 (2012). All of the ten
largest brokers on NYSE are also global investment banks. See NYSE Broker Volume, NYSE
MARKET DATA, http://www.nyxdata.com [http://perma.cc/YC2V-XUAG].
141. Michael Lewis, for example, claims that dark-pool operators sell access to their trading
venues to HFTs—without disclosing this practice to other users—and that these HFTs then
exploit other traders. LEWIS, supra note 2, at 123. Inferior execution could also occur on a dark
pool if the counterparties trading there were especially informed or were given information
about the existence of the customer limit orders posted there.
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The second alleged practice involves large investment banks
ignoring their brokerage customers’ instructions to direct their orders
to specific venues, and instead routing the orders to their own dark
142
pools, where, again they receive an inferior execution. The market
may not solve the problem, critics of the practice continue, because
customers have difficulty detecting the practice and, even when they
do, the customers are reluctant to switch brokers because of their
dependence on soft-money services the banks provide their most
143
loyal customers.
Dark-pool operators have been no strangers to legal actions
involving allegations that they have engaged in these kinds of
practices. The SEC has brought a number of successful proceedings
144
against dark-pool operators. Most recently, New York Attorney
General Eric Schneiderman filed a civil suit against Barclays alleging
that Barclays’ dark pool, Barclays LX (then the second largest in the
United States) misrepresented to users the involvement of HFTs in
LX; the informational advantages given to HFTs; and that Barclays,
as a broker, impartially sought to route orders for best execution,
when it actually disproportionately routed client orders to its own
145
pool.
We do not know whether any of these practices is in fact
widespread. As discussed below, they are clearly illegal and their
wealth-transfer and efficiency effects appear completely negative. We
will suggest in Part VI some policy reforms that would make
enforcement more effective if, despite the illegality of these practices,
evidence emerges that they are in fact widespread.
1. Understanding the function of dark pools. Recall that a dark
pool, like an exchange, is typically an electronic limit order book, but,
unlike an exchange, it does not publicly reveal the limit orders that
146
are posted on it. Moreover, it has the ability to restrict who can post

142. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 2, at 182–87, 264–65.
143. Id. at 102–03, 214–15.
144. See, e.g., Liquidnet Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 72,339, 2014 WL 2547522 (June 6,
2014); Pipeline Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 65,609, 2011 WL 5039038 (Oct. 24,
2011).
145. Complaint at 2–4, Schneiderman v. Barclays Capital, Inc., No. 451391/2014 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2014).
146. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.602(b)(1) (2015) (defining scope of reporting requirements); id.
§ 242.600(b)(65) (defining broker-dealer); id. § 242.600(b)(73)(ii)(A) (defining subject security).
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147

limit orders and submit marketable orders. Dark pools, despite their
nefarious-sounding moniker, can provide useful, legitimate services to
their customers. They arose because of the more liberal regulatory
environment established by the NMS Amendments to the Exchange
Act and the information-technology revolution. The key force driving
their rise—as with so many other institutions and practices within the
new stock market—was concern to mitigate adverse selection. A dark
pool’s most valuable characteristic, from this perspective, is to
provide a venue where uninformed buyers and sellers, seeking to
trade substantial amounts of stock, can minimize the movement of
prices against them and transact at prices potentially much better
148
than the NBO and NBB. These advantages arise from the fact that
quotes on a dark pool are not publicly displayed and because darkpool operators have the ability to exclude traders.
In terms of serving these functions, the ideal dark pool would be
one in which both the parties posting limit midpoint orders and
parties sending in marketable orders are completely uninformed. The
midpoint is a substantially better price for the buyer than the NBO,
and it is the same for the seller relative to the NBB. The system
begins to break down to the extent that the parties posting limit
orders are in fact informed. This is because their counterparties—the
parties submitting marketable orders—would be disadvantaged by
being in a dark pool because they would not be able to see from the
size of the posted limit orders that an informed party might be on the
other side. It similarly begins to break down to the extent that the
parties submitting the marketable orders are informed. This is
because they will only transact against the limit orders in the dark
pool when their information suggests that the midpoint is a price that
makes the transaction advantageous to them, which means it is a price
that makes the transaction disadvantageous to the person posting the
limit offer. Thus, the dark-pool operator provides a service to the
extent that it can effectively monitor both the parties posting the

147. See Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading System Rule 301(b)(5), 17
C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(5) (2015); Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act
Release No. 61,358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3614 (proposed Jan. 14, 2010) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 242) (“As [trading systems] that are exempt from exchange registration, [offexchange platforms] are not required to provide fair access [to all traders] unless they reach a
5% trading volume threshold in a stock, which none currently do[es]” and that “[a]s a result,
access to . . . [these platforms] . . . is determined primarily by private negotiation.”).
148. See, e.g., PREECE, supra note 140, at 12–13.

FOX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

252

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

11/2/2015 1:17 PM

[Vol. 65:191

midpoint limit orders and the parties sending in marketable orders to
149
assure that each side is relatively unlikely to be informed.
2. Wealth-transfer and efficiency considerations. To the extent
that a dark pool does not function in accordance with the ideal
described above, an order sent there may execute at less-desirable
terms than if it were sent to another venue. An investment bank that
operates a dark pool has intimate knowledge of the extent to which it
in fact falls short of this ideal. If a brokerage unit of an investment
bank sends a trader’s order to the bank’s own dark pool when the
broker knows, or should know, that the order would receive superior
execution elsewhere, the bank gains from the extra volume of trade in
150
its dark pool and in other possible ways, and the customer loses
from the inferior terms of execution. The same result is likely to arise
if the trader, having tried to determine where its order is most likely
to get best execution, instructs its broker that the order be sent to a
venue other than the bank’s dark pool, but the instruction is ignored.
The same result is also likely if the bank operating the dark pool
misrepresents to customers the nature of the parties allowed to trade
on the bank’s dark pool, in order to create the impression that there
exists less danger of informed counterparties there than is in fact the
case. Such a misrepresentation is likely to attract orders that could
execute on better terms elsewhere. All of these results generalize if
these failures are common practices: they make investment banks
richer and traders poorer.
At the simplest level, the negative efficiency consequences
arising from these broker or dark-pool-operator failures are the same
as the efficiency justifications more generally for legal remedies
against those who breach contracts or engage in misrepresentation. A
broker has a duty of best execution in the way it routes a customer’s
151
order. This requires the broker to exercise “reasonable diligence to
149. The operator provides a similar service to the extent that it keeps out HFTs that engage
in midpoint order exploitation.
150. A broker can make money off transactions occurring on its dark pool for several
additional reasons. If it is executing marketable orders on its dark pool, then a broker will
receive its commission without having to subtract the taker fee charged marketable orders on
most exchanges. If the broker is internalizing orders on its own dark pool and transacting
against them as principal, then it can make half the spread on each trade. Even more nefarious
inducements are suggested by the criticisms, such as exploitation of orders by a broker’s HFT
affiliate that has improperly been given details about orders.
151. This duty exists both as a matter of state common law of agency and under the rules of
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch Sec. Litig., 911 F.
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ascertain the best market” for a transaction to ensure an order
receives a price “as favorable as possible under prevailing market
152
conditions.” In essence, the duty of best execution is a default term
in the contract between the broker and its customer. Its violation
leads to the same efficiency concerns that any other breach would:
that the parties voluntarily entered into the transaction no longer
leads to the presumption that it can be expected to advance the
interests of both and that it is thus efficiency enhancing. The same
analysis applies to a broker disregarding customer instructions as to
153
where to route an order, which is also clearly illegal. When a
misrepresentation induces a party to enter a contract—in this case
agreeing to have an order sent to a dark pool that has different
counterparties than represented—the same problem is again created:
the transaction no longer carries the presumption of being efficiency
enhancing. Finally, if an investment bank that is both a broker and a
dark-pool operator provides information concerning a customer
order to its trading affiliates (or anyone else), it would be violating its
agency duties of confidentiality, provisions of Regulation ATS, and
154
probably its own marketing material. Again, one can view these
duties as default provisions in a contract, the breach of which robs the
transaction of the presumption that it is efficiency enhancing.
Supp 754, 760 (D.N.J. 1995), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 1998) (describing fiduciary duties of brokers); id. at
769 (“A broker-dealer’s duty to seek to obtain the best execution of customer orders derives
from the common law agency [duty] of loyalty . . . .” (quoting DIV. OF MKT. REGULATION,
supra note 28, at V-1)); see also DIV. OF MKT. REGULATION, supra note 28, at 21 (“A brokerdealer has a duty to seek to obtain the best execution for its customer orders.”).
152. FINRA Rules, supra note 87, at Rule 5310(a)(1). Reasonable diligence requires a
broker to consider “the character of the market for the security (e.g., price, volatility, relative
liquidity, and pressure on available communications)”; “the size and type of transaction”; “the
number of markets checked”; the “accessibility of the quotation”; and “the terms and conditions
of the order which result in the transaction, as communicated to the member and persons
associated with the member.” Id. at Rule 5310(a)(1)(A)–(E).
153. Ignoring a principal’s instructions would violate the agent’s duties noted above as well
as an agent’s specific duty of obedience to the principal. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Coombs, 654
N.E.2d 54, 61 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (discussing agent’s duty of obedience). Though many retail
brokers do not provide customers any choice as to execution venue, some do, and brokers for
institutional customers would be expected to provide options in this respect. See, e.g.,
SmartRouting, INTERACTIVE BROKERS, https://www.interactivebrokers.com/en/index.php?f=16
85 [http://perma.cc/K5H7-DAPM] (providing comparison of security prices offered by
Interactive Brokers versus industry average).
154. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05(2) (2006) (outlining agent’s duty of
confidentiality). Rule 301(b)(10) of Regulation ATS requires an alternative trading system
(ATS) (essentially, a nonexchange stock-market trading venue, such as a dark pool) to protect
users’ confidential information. 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(10) (2014).
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If we look at the efficiency question from the more nuanced
mode of inquiry that we have been generally using in this Article, the
story becomes a bit more complicated. If these practices are in fact
widespread, then they increase the effective costs of trading for those
uninformed traders whose orders go to dark pools. They also
discourage some traders from using dark pools who would use them,
and who would enjoy lower costs of trading as a result, if these
practices did not occur. For the same reasons as discussed with
respect to the earlier HFT practices, these effects will reduce the
efficiency of both the allocation of resources over time and the
allocation of risk in the economy.
On the other hand, these practices often probably improve
share-price accuracy and hence enhance the real economic-efficiency
effects that flow from that. This is true to the extent that informed
investors get advantages trading in dark pools because these practices
lower their cost of trading. It is also true to the extent that
uninformed investors are scared off from the dark pools because of
these practices. When more uninformed investors instead trade on
exchanges, the spreads are lower for informed investors. The
uninformed investors trading on exchanges subsidize informed
investors and this subsidy encourages those in the business of
generating and trading on fundamental value information. Even if the
positive efficiency effects from the practices dominate the negative
ones, however, which we have no reason to believe, we would not
recommend abandoning the traditional rules of upright commercial
practice that are breached by these practices. Other methods exist for
achieving the same thing, for example by prohibiting or limiting dark
155
pools.
F. Maker-Taker and Taker-Maker Fees
Recall that “maker-taker fees” refer to a situation in which a
trading venue pays a fee (a rebate to the broker) for each
nonmarketable limit order it receives that is ultimately executed, and
charges a fee to the broker for each marketable order it receives that
executes against a limit order posted on the venue. With “taker-

155. See Kevin S. Haeberle, Stock-Market Law and the Accuracy of Public Companies’
Stock Prices, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 25–27, 44–45), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2410422 [http://perma.cc/FF72-HEAC] (arguing
that off-exchange trading venues increase the probability of adverse selection on exchanges).
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156

maker fees” the venue does the opposite. In a typical maker-taker
structure, a venue charges in the range of $.0025–$.0030 per share for
marketable orders and pays rebates for executed nonmarketable
157
orders in the range of $.0020–$.0025 per share. In contrast, the
taker-maker scheme will typically charge executed nonmarketable
limit orders $.0007–$.0010 per share and rebate $.0002–$.0005. The
actual fees and rebates vary somewhat across exchanges and vary
158
through time, but under either scheme the venue typically nets in
the neighborhood of $.0005 per share.
The maker-taker and taker-maker fee structures have been
subject to vigorous criticism. In a letter to the SEC, Senator Charles
Schumer argued that they “create[d] a conflict of interest, as brokers
may be incentivized to execute trades on a particular venue even if
that venue is not offering the best price,” creating “room for brokers
to arguably put their own interests ahead of their clients by
159
maximizing the rebates they receive from exchanges.” Senator Carl
Levin, asking a TD Ameritrade executive about the fact that TD
Ameritrade had directed virtually all nonmarketable orders to a
single trading venue, which happened to offer the highest rebate for
such orders, suggested, “[y]our subjective judgment as to which
market provided best execution for tens of millions of customer
orders a year allowed you to route all of the orders to the market that
paid you the most . . . . I find that to be a frankly pretty incredible
160
coincidence.” Since those hearings, a class-action lawsuit has been

156. See supra Part II.C.7.
157. See generally Lawrence E. Harris, Maker-Taker Pricing Effects on Market Quotations
2 (Nov. 14, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.securitiesmosaic.com/gateway/sec/
speech/hujibusiness_Maker-taker.pdf [http://perma.cc/DP97-SCJP] (discussing typical makertaker pricing scheme).
158. The actual fees and rebates imposed must be publicly available and must be the same
across all stocks traded on the exchange. The fees and rebates for any exchange are available on
the exchange’s website. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(b)(3)(A)(ii)(4), 15
U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4(f)(2) (2013).
159. Letter from Sen. Charles Schumer to Hon. Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC (May 10,
2012). Flash Boys added its own criticism, declaring that “[t]he maker-taker system of fees and
kickbacks used by all of the exchanges was simply a method for paying the big Wall Street
banks to screw the investors whose interests they were meant to guard.” LEWIS, supra note 2, at
168–69.
160. See William Alden, supra note 7. A recent New York Times editorial suggested that
maker-taker fees are “corrupting” brokers, who “under the guise of making subjective
judgments about best execution, . . . were routinely sending orders to venues that paid the
highest rebates,” and concluded by calling for greater regulation or elimination of maker-taker
fees. See Editorial, supra note 7 (using TD Ameritrade data from the fourth quarter of 2012).
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launched against TD Ameritrade, alleging that it violated its duty of
161
best execution in this way.
1. Modeling the fee structures. To see how these fee structures
work, we will start with a model that makes several simplifying
assumptions. These assumptions are that the maker rebate and taker
fee are the same and equal r, that there is a single, consolidated
trading venue, that all traders (not just HFTs, the traders are in the
business of liquidity supply) submit their orders directly to the trading
venue rather than doing so through a broker, and that regular traders
(that is, all traders except HFTs) are rational actors who are well
informed about the terms of trade available in the market. Under
these assumptions, maker-taker fees and rebates turn out to be
entirely benign: they have no effect on how liquidity is supplied or on
anyone’s wealth position. We will then go on to consider the
consequences of relaxing these assumptions.
a. Liquidity suppliers. Let us look at things first from the
liquidity suppliers’ point of view. These are HFTs, the entities in the
competitive business of supplying liquidity through posting
nonmarketable limit orders, as well as regular traders who post such
orders in order to transact at better prices than they would get from
marketable orders. Consider first the HFTs. Let S equal half of the
spread HFTs need to cover their costs associated with making a
market given the possibility of informed trading. Let P be the
consensus value of a security at the time a quote is made. Absent a
liquidity maker rebate, the limit orders posted by the HFTs at the
162
trading venue will put the offer at P + S and the bid P – S. When
there is rebate of R (R < S), the offer will be P + S – R. This is
because an HFT will receive R every time a limit order it posted
transacts, and so receiving P + S – R is, from an economic point of
view, the equivalent to receiving P + S if there were no rebate (that is,
the amount the HFT would need to receive to break even without a
rebate). Under the same logic, the bid will be P – S + R, which is the
economic equivalent for the HFT of paying the breakeven price of P
163
– S per share in a world without rebates. Rational regular traders
161. See, e.g., Complaint at 20, Klein v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 14-cv-5738
(D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2014), 2014 WL 5018542.
162. See supra Part III.B.
163. For expository simplicity, the analysis assumes the tick size (the minimum difference
allowed by the market between one price and the prices above and below) is infinitesimal,
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who submit nonmarketable limit orders will set the limit that they
specify so, relative to the limit they would have set in the absence of a
rebate, they adjust a buy order limit down by R and a sell order up by
R.
b. Liquidity takers. Now consider liquidity takers, that is, traders
who submit marketable orders. On one hand, because of the
adjustments to the available offers and bids described above, posted
by liquidity suppliers in reaction to receiving rebates, the offer price
which traders submitting marketable orders pay for shares, and the
bid price at which they sell them, are each improved by R relative to
what they would have paid or received in the no-rebate world,
respectively. On the other hand, this narrowing of the spread is
exactly offset by the fee R they must pay the venue for each share
bought or sold.
c. The benign effect of the fees and rebates given the simplifying
assumptions. This analysis shows that the combination of maker
rebates and taker fees leads to precisely the same terms of trade from
an economic point of view as would prevail in their absence. So there
is no reason to think, at least under the assumptions we have
employed so far, that anyone would behave differently than in a
world without rebates. This same analysis holds for taker rebates and
maker fees, because, if they are equal, they simply correspond to a
negative R in the expressions above.
2. Relaxing the assumptions of the model. Consider what
happens when we relax various assumptions of the model.
a. Relaxing the assumptions about the trading venues. Relaxing
the simplifying assumptions we made about trading venues does not
change the conclusions. We started with the assumption that the
maker rebate and the taker fee are equal. In reality, they are not
because the venue needs to be paid a fee for the service of providing a
164
place to trade. This fee is the difference between the two. The size
of the venue’s fee is irrelevant to the current discussion, and, with it

whereas, pursuant to NMS Rule 612, for most stocks it is in fact a penny, but including this
complication in the analysis leaves the conclusion largely unchanged.
164. The rebate paid to liquidity makers is generally smaller than the fee charged to the
liquidity taker in the maker-taker structure, and the opposite in the taker-maker structure.
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taken out, the maker rebate and taker fee are by definition always
going to be equal.
We also assumed a single, consolidated trading venue. The real
world, with competing venues, should work the same way, however,
at least as we continue to hold on to our assumptions about the
nature of the traders in the market, because both liquidity suppliers
and liquidity takers, when deciding whether to send an order to any
given venue, can make the same calculations as in the model above
that the venue’s fee and rebate system will affect bids and offers in a
way that just offsets these fees and rebates.
b. Relaxing the assumptions about regular traders.
The
assumptions about traders may play a more critical role. To start, we
assumed that regular traders send their orders directly to the market
without broker intermediation. That means that in maker-taker
venues, traders who submit nonmarketable limit orders would receive
the rebate directly and those who submit marketable orders would
pay the fee directly (and the reverse for taker-maker venues). In fact,
few regular traders are allowed to send orders directly to trading
venues; they must use a broker. So, for a regular trader, the broker is
the one who receives the rebate and pays the fee. And typically,
nothing in the trader’s contract with its broker provides that the
165
rebates and fees be passed through directly to the trader, nor is this
required by regulation.
If we continue to assume competitive exchanges, a competitive
market for brokerage services, and regular traders who are rational
and sufficiently informed to be able to effectively monitor the quality
of service their brokers are delivering, the effects of the maker-taker
fee structure (and the taker-maker one) remain benign. As set out
below, the maker rebates offered by a given venue will lead to
commensurately lower brokerage fees for nonmarketable limit orders
sent to this venue and the taker fees will lead to commensurately
higher brokerage fees for marketable orders there. So the rebates and
fees are simply passed on indirectly through their effects on
brokerage fees.

165. High Speed Trading Hearings, supra note 8, at 8 (statement of Robert Battalio,
Professor of Finance, University of Notre Dame). Interactive Brokers offers such a contract, but
it also offers a fixed-price-for-execution contract. See Commissions: Stocks, ETFs and
Warrants—Overview, INTERACTIVE BROKERS, https://www.interactivebrokers.com/en/?f=
commission [http://perma.cc/3KKK-WPUR].
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Consider first a trader who wishes her broker to submit on her
behalf a nonmarketable buy limit order. This buy order will be
competing with bids posted by HFTs. Recall that each HFT will
increase its bid price commensurately to the size of the rebate, if any,
at the venue where it is posting its offer. The trader’s limit order, to
have the same likelihood of timely execution as it would in a venue
without a rebate, would need to have a commensurately higher limit
price as well. If the trader’s limit order ultimately does transact, the
cost of buying a share to the trader is her limit price plus Bnm, where
Bnm is the broker’s commission for nonmarketable orders posted on
that venue. If Cnm is the cost to the broker for the act of servicing a
nonmarketable order, but the broker receives R as a rebate, then the
broker’s net cost is Cnm – R. In a competitive brokerage market with
informed consumers of the service, the forces of competition would
assure that Bnm = Cnm – R, whatever R is at the venue. When R is
higher, the trader will need to submit a commensurately higher limit
price to get the same likelihood of timely execution, and so would
need a commensurately lower brokerage fee to come out even.
Now consider a trader who wishes its broker to submit on his
behalf a marketable buy limit order. The price he will need to pay will
be P + S + Bm, where Bm is the broker’s commission for
nonmarketable orders posted on this venue. If Cm is the cost to the
broker for the act of servicing a marketable order, and the broker
must pay a taker fee of R as a rebate, the broker’s net cost is Cm + R.
In a competitive brokerage market with informed consumers of the
service, the forces of competition would assure that Bm = Cn + R,
whatever R is. When R is lower, S will be commensurately higher,
and so the brokerage fee will need to be lower for the trader to end
166
up paying the same net price for a share.
This story, though, has two flaws, which raise, but do not prove,
the possibility that rebates affect how players in the market behave.
First, at least for most retail trades, brokerage fees are fixed on a perexecution basis and do not depend on the venue in which a particular
order transacts. Second, it is not so easy for a trader to monitor the
performance of his broker. With brokerage commissions invariant to
where an order is sent, a broker has an incentive to send a
nonmarketable limit order to the venue with the highest maker rebate
and marketable orders to the venue with the lowest taker fee.

166. Mirror images of these stories apply to nonmarketable and marketable sell orders.
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This problem is potentially more acute with a nonmarketable
limit order because determining whether or not it received best
execution is more difficult to figure out than with marketable orders.
The quality of a limit-order execution includes whether it executes or
not, how long it takes to get executed, and how likely the market is to
move in a disadvantageous direction following an execution. A recent
167
paper sheds some light on this question. To take the extremes at the
time of their data, Edge X had a rebate rate of $.0030 per share and
provided a fill rate (partial or full) of 54 percent, an average fill speed
of 111 seconds, and a good-fill ratio (measured as the proportion of
time the midpoint of the market quotes five minutes after a
transaction was above the transaction price at the bid or below the
transaction price at the ask) of 49 percent. In contrast, Boston, with a
rebate rate of -$.0014 per share had a fill rate of 74.5 percent, a fill
speed of thirty-three seconds and a good-fill ratio of 55 percent. Four
retail brokerage houses sent roughly half of their limit orders to Edge
168
X and only Interactive Brokers spread its limit orders around.
Evidently, nonmarketable limit orders posted on high-rebate venues
are not getting very good execution. Yet that is where many retail
brokerages are sending nonmarketable limit orders when the
customer does not specify a venue for execution.
3. Wealth-transfer considerations. Even if traders are unable to
monitor the quality of broker execution completely, especially with
regard to nonmarketable limit orders, the level of competition among
trading venues and among brokers probably assures that neither type
of enterprise is making excess returns as a result of the maker-taker
and taker-maker rebate and fee structures that abound. In terms of
traders, there appears to be excess liquidity on the maker-taker
venues and this benefits large traders who place marketable orders
there. Those who are harmed are the ordinary traders whose
nonmarketable limit orders get inferior execution. Putting a cost on
inferior execution is difficult.
4. Efficiency considerations. Extra liquidity of the kind that
appears to be generated by venue rebates and fees may be valuable to
167. Robert Battalio, Shane Corwin & Robert Jennings, Can Brokers Have It All? On the
Relation Between Make-Take Fees & Limit Order Execution Quality 10 (Dec. 13, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www3.nd.edu/~scorwin/documents/BattalioCorwinJennings_20
131213_SSRN.pdf [http://perma.cc/83NY-JZ3A].
168. Id. at 11.
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informed traders and hence may add to share-price accuracy. The
welfare effects of poor execution quality for traders placing
nonmarketable limit orders are harder to trace through without a
better sense than we have of who they are and what they are trying to
accomplish. They too may be informed traders, or they may be
uninformed traders who think they are informed. In any event, as
with dark-pool misconduct, it is illegal for brokers not to provide best
execution, which is an implicit term in their contracts with customers.
Even if their failure to do so results in greater price accuracy,
allowing this breach of an understanding between broker and
customer does not seem the right way to increase share-price
accuracy.
G. Purchase of Order Flow
Many brokers sell their order flow to “internalizers” such as
Citadel and KCG Americas, which are trading venues that match
incoming buy orders with nearly simultaneous incoming sell orders,
169
buying from the sellers and selling to the buyers. The payments the
brokers receive from the internalizers are referred to as “payment for
170
order flow.” Internalizers typically only pay for marketable orders.
They generally agree to provide the broker’s customers with nominal
price improvement, with shares purchased from sell-order customers
at perhaps $.0001 over the NBB and shares sold to buy-order
customers at that amount below the NBO. Battalio and his coauthors
show that nine out of the ten retail brokers studied send virtually all
171
marketable orders to order-flow purchasers.
Payment for order flow has been heavily criticized as potentially
“creat[ing] . . . conflicts of interest” between brokers, who seek to
maximize revenue from selling order flow, and customers, who might
172
receive better execution elsewhere. Indeed, in a letter to SEC Chair
White, Senator Carl Levin stated that “[c]onflicts of interest erode
public confidence in the markets” and that “payments [for order flow]
create another incentive for brokers to maximize their own profits at
169. HARRIS, supra note 18, at 520–22 (defining and discussing internalization).
170. Allen Ferrell, A Proposal for Solving the “Payment for Order Flow” Problem, 74 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1028 (2001).
171. Battalio et al., supra note 167, at 10.
172. High Speed Trading Hearings, supra note 8, at 33 (statement of Joseph P. Ratterman,
CEO, BATS Global Markets); id. at 2 (opening statement of Sen. Carl Levin) (“‘[P]ayment for
order flow,’ can add up to untold millions, and almost every retail broker keeps these payments
rather than passing them on to clients”).
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the expense of best execution of customer orders,” and should be
173
eliminated.
1. Wealth effects. If the internalizer and broker markets are each
competitive, then the analysis of the wealth effects of payment for
order flow is very simple. There are none. The internalizers pay the
brokers what they are able to make above their costs (plus a market
return on capital) from executing the buy and sell orders on the
promised terms of slight price improvement. What the brokers
receive reduces the costs of providing brokerage services and in a
competitive brokerage market these savings are passed on through
lower commissions.
If, on the other hand, the internalization market is not
competitive, then internalizers are the monopsonist equivalent of
oligopolists and may have the market power to pay less for order flow
than what they make above their costs (plus a market return on
capital) from executing orders at a slight improvement over the NBO
and NBB. What brokers then pass on to customers in the form of
lower brokerage fees would be insufficient, leaving traders worse off.
Alternatively, the internalization market may be competitive, but the
broker market may not be. In that case, the brokers may sell the
order flow for an appropriate price but only pass a portion of those
savings on to customers. If so, then just like with maker-taker fees,
payment for order flow could create a genuine agency problem by
aligning brokers’ incentives with receiving payments for order flow,
whereas better execution may be obtained on an exchange. In this
noncompetitive version of the market, customers receive inferior
execution because their orders are not routed to exchanges and only
receive a portion of the savings obtained.
2. Efficiency effects. Liquidity suppliers on the exchange do not
get the opportunity to interact with internalized order flow. This
174
alters the adverse-selection environment on the exchange. By
removing uninformed order flow from exchanges, the probability that
liquidity providers face informed traders increases, thereby increasing
the spread that fundamental-value traders need to pay. This, as we
have seen, reduces their incentives to engage in this activity and thus
reduces share-price accuracy. On the other hand, it is possible that

173. Letter from Sen. Carl Levin to Hon. Mary Jo White, Chairman, SEC supra note 14.
174. See Haeberle, supra note 155, at 44–45.
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execution at terms slightly better than NBO and NBB, when
combined with lower brokerage fees resulting from the indirect
passing on of at least part of the payment for order flow, reduces the
effective cost of trading for uninformed traders. If so, the practice of
brokers selling order flow to internalizers improves the efficiency
with which resources are allocated over time and the efficiency with
which risk is allocated. Still, for these efficiency gains to be fully
realized, internalizers must pay competitive rebates for order flow,
and these must be fully passed on to traders one way or another.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Potential regulatory responses, prompted by the preceding
survey of controversial practices in the new stock market, fall into
four groups. The first three controversial practices that we
reviewed—electronic front running, slow-market arbitrage, and
exploitation of dark pool midpoint orders—all involve HFTs
acquiring information concerning newly executed transactions and
changing their quotes ahead of others in the market. The next
practice, the relation of HFTs to market volatility involves the entire
market’s reliance on this form of liquidity supply. The next two
practices relate to dark-pool operations and their investment-bank
operators as brokers. And the last two involve payments to brokers
relating to the customer orders they are handling.
A. HFT Speed in Obtaining Market Information
Because electronic front running, slow-market arbitrage, and
exploitation of dark-pool-midpoint orders all involve HFTs acquiring
market information ahead of others, once we have assessed the social
desirability or undesirability of each of these practices, any possible
reform will need to take account of its effect on all three. Below we
will make such an assessment of each of these practices and then
discuss possible reforms.
1. Would it be desirable to eliminate electronic front running?
Persons transacting in stocks have always played a cat-and-mouse
game in which each tries to figure out what the others are doing. One
function of regulation is to step in and prohibit particular
informational advantages when such intervention can lead to
improved social outcomes. The question is whether the informational
advantages HFTs obtain from electronic front running call for such an
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intervention. The first step to answering this question requires a
policy analysis that compares a world with and without electronic
front running. Based on what we know at the moment, the matter is
too close to call, with considerations pointing in both directions. The
unfairness case against electronic front running is weak. It is the
efficiency case for and against the practice that is too close to call.
a. Actual unfairness. The rhetoric of the critics of electronic front
running focuses primarily on what they see as the unfairness of the
175
resulting wealth transfers. Deeper analysis, however, shows that a
compelling case for the elimination of the practice cannot be made on
this basis of perceived unfairness. As we have seen above, the
practice actually appears to benefit ordinary people to the extent that
they invest directly in the market as retail customers. The same is true
to the extent that such ordinary people have channeled savings to
mutual funds or pension funds that invest all or a portion of their
funds in equities on an index basis and execute their purchase and
sale transactions on exchanges. This is because retail investors are
largely uninformed and index investing is by definition uninformed.
The elimination of electronic front running would reduce liquidity,
which, as we have seen, would make uninformed trading more
expensive and the uninformed traders would enjoy no countervailing
gain from the inability of market makers to detect transactions at
176
other exchanges. To the extent that ordinary people invest through
actively managed mutual and pension funds, which, by definition,
seek to be informed traders, any net benefit that would arise from the
practice’s elimination is, as discussed above, likely to be substantially

175. See supra notes 83–84.
176. It should be noted that a significant portion of retail marketable orders and indexbased institutional orders execute off exchanges in venues where the trades can be identified as
largely uninformed. See Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by
Amendment No. 1, To Establish the Retail Price Improvement Program on a Pilot Basis until
12 Months from the Date of Implementation, Exchange Act Release No. 68,937, at 17, 78 Fed.
Reg. 12,397, 12,404 (Feb. 22, 2013); PREECE, supra note 140, at 3 (“Internalization is also
thought to account for almost 100% of all retail marketable order flow.”). In a fully competitive
market, the spreads associated with these trades should not include a significant adverseselection component. Thus, they should be unaffected by whether or not electronic front
running occurs on the exchanges, when, in the absence of the practice, the spreads would be
wider to reflect the greater risk that the HFTs are dealing with informed traders. In reality,
however, the spreads are barely smaller in these off-exchange executions (that is, there is only a
small amount of “price improvement”). As analyzed supra Part V.G, why this is the case will
affect the conclusion of whether wider spreads on the exchange in fact are passed on to the
retail customer.
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captured by the persons running the funds in the form of the higher
fees and salaries they would be able to command.
b. Efficiency. A stronger case can be made for the elimination of
electronic front running on efficiency grounds. As at least our first-cut
efficiency analysis of electronic front running shows, elimination of
the practice would involve an unavoidable efficiency trade-off. There
would be efficiency gains in the form of better capital allocation and
utilization of the economy’s existing productive capacity, which would
177
arise from increases in price accuracy. But there would be efficiency
losses in the form of less-efficient allocation of resources over time
178
and allocation of risk, which would arise from decreases in liquidity.
A priori, however, there is no obvious reason for choosing the point
in this trade-off associated with the elimination of the practice over
the point associated with the continuation of the practice.
Also, our more nuanced analysis, which takes account of the
presence of announcement-information traders and insideinformation traders, suggests it is quite possible that eliminating
electronic front running would in fact reduce, rather than improve,
price accuracy, so no trade-off occurs and the practice is
179
unambiguously efficiency enhancing.
c. Resources consumed. What is clear is that prohibiting
electronic front running would save the very substantial human and
material resources currently supporting the practice that would be
freed up to be used elsewhere in the economy in some more clearly
productive way. These savings suggest that if a reasonably cost
effective way could be found to eliminate the practice and that no
market forces are likely to take us to the same result in the
foreseeable future, such regulation would be desirable, unless we

177. See supra Part V.A.2.
178. See supra Parts V.A.2 and V.A.3.
179. See supra Part V.A.4. It is worth noting, however, that the example of electronic front
running we address deals with a market maker who defensively removes a quote when a
transaction at another exchange is observed. It is possible to imagine an example in which the
market maker removed its initial quote, and then posts an inferior quote against which an
incoming order nonetheless transacts, because of a lack of quote competition at the top of the
book. If this higher quote simply reflects the market maker seizing an opportunity to charge a
higher price, then it is just a wealth transfer with no social benefits. In fact, the higher cost of
trading can lead to a variety of negative effects. Conversely, if the higher price represented an
upward adjustment in the quote for risk-management reasons, then our analysis might mirror
that in the text above.
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affirmatively believe the practice is efficiency enhancing on a net
basis in terms of the factors discussed just above.
d. Appearance of unfairness. Although our analysis above
suggests that electronic front running does not actually result in
unfairness, HFT practices of this sort are clearly viewed by a
180
substantial portion of the public as being unfair. Much of this
perception is of course due to the very criticism of HFT practices that
this Article seeks to subject to more serious analysis. Normally, the
better response to misunderstanding is education, not a change in
what people are allowed to do when the activity does not in fact pose
a problem. Still, this perception of unfairness may be very hard to
eradicate. If one were persuaded that an efficiency analysis leans
toward the conclusion that the practice is on balance socially
undesirable, the existence of an unfounded but persistent sense of
unfairness can add to the desirability of its prohibition. Such a
perception of unfairness is demoralizing: it simply makes people feel
bad to think that a major social institution is corrupt. It also
discourages direct and indirect ownership of equities by persons who,
absent having this sense that something unfair was going on, would
find equities to be an investment vehicle that suits some of their
needs.
2. Adding slow-market arbitrage and dark-pool-midpoint-order
exploitation to the analysis. There are presumably large synergies in
terms of the use of real productive resources between electronic front
running, slow-market arbitrage, and dark-pool-midpoint-order
exploitation. So resource use is not an independent consideration
with regard to these other two speed-based HFT practices. Still, these
two practices each seem unquestionably undesirable.
No fairness argument can be made that slow-market arbitrage
helps any ordinary investors: it hurts all regular traders, uninformed
181
and informed alike, by increasing their effective cost of trading.
And because of this, its economic welfare effects are unambiguously
182
negative as well. The increased effective cost of trading for
informed traders means that it is less rewarding to seek out bits of
publicly available information and to analyze their implications in a

180. See supra notes 83–84.
181. See supra Part V.A.2.
182. See supra Part V.A.3.
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sophisticated way. As a consequence, share-price accuracy, with its
beneficial effects on the real economy, is reduced. The increased
effective cost of trading on uninformed traders has negative effects on
the efficient allocation of resources over time and on the efficient
allocation of risk.
For slow-market arbitrage to occur, however, the same HFT
must have posted a quote that is at the top of the book of an
exchange; discover that the best quote available for that stock
nationally has changed; an order must transact against the HFT’s
now-stale quote; and the HFT must be able to transact against the
new best quote before anyone else can. This seems like it would be an
unusual circumstance, although it is worth further empirical study.
Dark-pool-midpoint-order exploitation hurts uninformed
investors and in so doing again has negative effects on the efficient
allocation of resources over time and on the efficient allocation of
183
risk.
It arguably helps share-price efficiency by deterring
uninformed traders from using dark pools so they use exchanges
instead, thereby causing spreads to lower and reducing the effective
cost of trading for fundamental-value-informed traders. But if it is in
fact good social policy to push uninformed traders into the market to
subsidize such informed trading, other methods could be utilized to
accomplish this goal more directly, such as prohibiting or limiting the
use of dark pools.
The policies and procedures of the trading venue IEX illustrate
the possibility that private-market solutions can midpoint-order
exploitation without the need for regulatory intervention. IEX
imposes a 350-microsecond delay before transactions can be placed
through its matching engine during which it utilizes private-data feeds
from all exchanges to check whether the midpoint of the best
available quotes has changed and thus ensure that a midpoint order is
184
not executing at a stale NBO or NBB. The inducement for dark
pools to implement such reforms is that traders would find the
reformed venues more attractive places to send their orders.

183. See supra Part V.C.2.
184. IEX True Price™ Matching Engine, IEX TRADING, http://www.iextrading.com/trading/
trueprice [http://perma.cc/DTN2-NYEF]. A representative of Goldman Sachs has also said that
there is significant client pressure for Goldman to ensure its dark pool has access to private data
feeds from exchanges. See 2015 Workshops: The New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense,
COLUM. L. SCH. (May 14, 2015), http://web.law.columbia.edu/capital-markets/previous-work
shops/2015 [http://perma.cc/67WP-PL4Q].
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3. Measures to prevent electronic front running and other speedbased practices. When we combine our ambivalence concerning
electronic front running with our clear negative evaluation of slowmarket arbitrage and midpoint-order exploitation, and add in the
substantial resources that HFTs consume undertaking these three
practices, we lean toward favoring reforms that would eliminate HFT
advantages in obtaining information ahead of others in the market, if
such a reform were relatively low cost. The recent controversy
surrounding HFTs—and electronic front running in particular—has
resulted in a spate of proposals for addressing their activity, which
offer a range of potential benefits and costs.
Two proposals address HFT activity in general by taking aim at
185
high-frequency quoting activity.
The first provides financial
disincentives for high-volume quoting, such as NYSE Euronext’s
186
recent surcharge on each order above a 100:1 order-to-trade ratio.
These fees may simply be a sensible response to HFTs externalizing
the cost of bandwidth use. Things get more complicated, however, if
the fees are higher than what is necessary to tax this externality and
are aimed at reducing practices such as electronic front running.
HFTs revise quotes for many reasons other than information they
learn from electronic front running and, assuming HFTs are often
revising quotes above the 100:1 rate, then fees on quotes in numbers
exceeding this limit would create disincentives for all such revisions.
Thus, they can be expected to widen spreads and reduce depth
because they make it harder for market makers to control adverse187
selection and inventory risks through their quoting strategies. That
is not a concern if these fees are imposed by an exchange in active
competition with other exchanges: customers can decide whether they
like the trade-offs implied by the ultimate results. But it would be a
concern if mandated by regulation as a way to stop electronic front
running.
A second proposal regarding HFT conduct would impose a
minimum time in force for quotes, prohibiting them from being
188
canceled, within, for example, 100 milliseconds of submission.
Again, HFTs cancel orders faster than 100 milliseconds for reasons
other than electronic front running. The costs of such a plan in terms

185.
186.
187.
188.

See Jones, supra note 98, at 42–51.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 47.
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of liquidity provision could be substantial. It sets a floor on the length
of the option offered by liquidity providers to liquidity takers,
increasing their chance of being adversely selected and so widening
189
spreads.
Another much-discussed proposal involves altering the current
190
market-trading structure.
Stock exchanges currently conduct
continuous two-sided (that is buy and sell) auctions for each security.
A recent proposal, endorsed by New York Attorney General Eric
191
Schneiderman, is to replace this with frequent batch auctions, say,
every 100 milliseconds. Batch auctions would consist of uniformprice, sealed-bid auctions conducted at discrete time intervals.
Echoing our own concerns about electronic front running, the
proposal argues that the current structure permits frequent technical
arbitrage opportunities based on speed, creating a socially wasteful
192
arms race to exploit these opportunities. Frequent batch auctions
would eliminate the value of minute speed advantages. Though the
proposal may have significant merit, much would depend on
implementation. To eliminate electronic front running, every
exchange would need to have its auction (nearly) simultaneously. If
auctions were sufficiently frequent and at different times at each
exchange, then intraexchange exploitation of tiny speed differences
might persist, including electronic front running.
We think an approach to ending HFT information speed
advantages exists that is simpler both in terms of implementation and
in terms of achieving the needed legal changes. None of these three
practices would be possible if private data feeds did not make market
quote and transaction data effectively available to some market
participants before others. Thus, one potential regulatory response to
the problem posed by HFT activity is to require that private
dissemination of quote and trade information be delayed until the
exclusive processor under the Regulation NMS scheme, referred to as
the “SIP,” has publicly disseminated information from all exchanges.

189. Id.
190. See Eric B. Budish, Peter Cramton & John J. Shim, The High-Frequency Trading Arms
Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response 6 (Chicago Booth Research, Paper
No. 14-03, Feb. 17, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2388265 [http://perma.cc/937M-8KLE].
191. See Linette Lopez, New York Attorney General Endorses A Radical Change To The
Way The World Trades Stocks, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 18, 2014, 4:42 PM), http://www.
businessinsider.com/schneiderman-endorses-batch-auctions-2014-3
[http://perma.cc/2KC3-8Q
7J].
192. Budish et al., supra note 190, at 12–20.
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Rule 603(a)(2) of Regulation NMS prohibits exchanges from
193
“unreasonably discriminatory” distribution of market data. In its
adopting release for Regulation NMS, the SEC outlined its
interpretation of that provision, which is that privately “distributed
data could not be made available on a more timely basis [to private
clients] than core data is made available to a Network processor [the
SIP]. . . . Rule 603(a) prohibits an SRO or broker-dealer from
transmitting data to a vendor or user any sooner than it transmits the
194
data to a Network processor.” Core data is composed of last-trade
reports and each exchange’s current highest bids and lowest offers for
195
each security, from which its NBB and NBO is ascertained.
This interpretation of the “unreasonably discriminatory”
distribution language of Rule 603(a)(2) appears to say that it is
permissible for core-data information to reach an HFT more rapidly
than the public recipients of the SIP as long as the signal sending the
data to the HFT did not precede the signal sent to the SIP. The
exchanges and the HFTs, in agreeing to their co-location
arrangements, have assumed this interpretation to be correct. The
SEC, in its choice of enforcement actions, has confirmed this
interpretation as well. No actions have been brought against colocation arrangements in which the signal sent to HFTs did not
precede the signal sent to the SIP. Indeed, the SEC, in a 2010
Concept Release, acknowledged the existence of exchanges’ widely
known practice of submitting data simultaneously to the SIP and
private feeds and that, as a result, private feeds will reach subscribers
196
far faster than the SIP distributes its data. In a 2012 proceeding,
however, the SEC found that the NYSE had been sending market
data, including best bids and offers, to private subscribers before it
197
sent that data to the SIP, and fined NYSE $5 million.

193. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.603(a)(2) (2015). Section 11A(c)(1) of the Exchange Act authorizes
the Commission to regulate market data. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(b) (2012).
194. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,567 & 37,569 (June 29, 2005) (adopting
the release).
195. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.601, 242.602 (2015) (requiring exchanges to report last sales—
price and size of the most recent trades—and current best bids and offers); NetCoalition v. SEC,
615 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (discussing the core data regime).
196. See, e.g., Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No.
61,358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3601 (Jan. 21, 2010) (discussing how the consolidation processing
time of the SIP “means that [private] data feeds can reach end-users faster than the
consolidated data feeds.”).
197. See New York Stock Exchange LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 67,857, 2012 WL
4044880, *1–3, *12 (Sept. 14, 2012).
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The language of Rule 603(a)(2) could plausibly be interpreted in
a contrary fashion: sending the signal simultaneously to an HFT and
to the SIP arguably is an “unreasonably discriminatory” distribution
of core data to the end users given that it is predictable that some will
consistently receive it faster than others. This interpretation of Rule
603(a)(2)’s language already has its advocates. The market research
firm Nanex has repeatedly insisted that the exchanges are in standing
198
violation of Regulation NMS for this reason. Interestingly, this
focus on the time at which information reaches end users rather than
the time of a public announcement is the approach the courts and the
SEC have traditionally taken with respect to when, for purposes of
199
the regulation of insider trading, information is no longer nonpublic.
Thus the SEC’s ability to alter its interpretation of Rule 603(a)(2)
may be the path of least legislative or regulatory resistance to
prohibiting electronic front running. One may feel, however, that too
much has already been invested in reliance on the SEC’s apparent
original interpretation for a prohibition to be imposed without the
normal procedures of an administrative-agency rule change. If so,
then that process can be followed and the rule amended.
B. HFTs and Volatility
Overall, we concluded that no evidence exists of a relationship
200
between HFT activities and general increases in market volatility.
We conclude as well that the connection between HFTs and episodic
volatility is not due to predatory behavior on their parts, but rather
their rational withdrawal from the market at certain moments of
201
stress.
Nonetheless, a number of existing proposals seek to address the
alleged link between HFT activity and volatility. These proposals fall
into two groups: one group seeks to ameliorate trading volatility
generally and would incidentally affect HFTs; the second group seeks
to target a specific link between HFTs and volatility.

198. See Direct vs. SIP Data Feed, NANEX (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.nanex.net/aqck2/4599.
html [http://perma.cc/SY69-GKTS]; HFT Front Running, All The Time, NANEX (Sept. 30, 2013),
http://www.nanex.net/aqck2/4442.html [http://perma.cc/7XJE-KCU2].
199. See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968); Investors Mgmt.
Co., Exchange Act Release No. 9207, 1971 WL 120502, at *8 (July 29, 1971).
200. See supra Part V.D.1.
201. See supra Part V.D.2.
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Consider the first group. Soon after the Flash Crash, the SEC
phased in single-stock circuit breakers, which impose a five-minute
trading halt if the price of a specific stock moves by more than 10
202
percent within five minutes. This trading pause is designed to give
liquidity providers breathing room to consider whether order
203
imbalances actually reflect information or not. Similarly, the SEC
has also approved a “limit up-limit down” plan that pauses trading in
a stock if transactions move more than a certain amount, often 5
percent, away from the security’s average price over the last five
204
minutes. These are moderate proposals, which should have salutary
effects in moderating future crashes.
The second set of proposals tackle the important question of
whether market makers, however they be defined, should have
stronger affirmative liquidity-providing obligations than they
currently do. In the wake of the Flash Crash, exchanges have already
imposed a range of affirmative obligations on institutionally identified
market makers at their venues. For instance, the NYSE has
“designated market makers,” who have specific obligations to help
maintain an orderly and continuous trading market in particular
205
stocks. Some commentators want to go further down this road and
to impose on HFTs legal responsibilities resembling those imposed on
the institutionally designated market makers of yesteryear, such as
206
the specialists of the pre-2005 NYSE.
There is an obvious attraction to proposals that might moderate
the flight of liquidity provision from the market during periods of
extreme volatility. The historical evidence, however, suggests that
202. Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Proposed Rule Change to Amend FINRA
Rule 6121, Exchange Act Release No. 62,251, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,183, 34,184 (June 10, 2010); Order
Granting Accelerated Approval to Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Trading Pauses Due to
Extraordinary Market Volatility, Exchange Act Release No. 62,252, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,186, 34,187
(June 10, 2010).
203. Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Proposed Rule Change to Amend FINRA
Rule 6121, 75 Fed. Reg. at 34,186; Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Proposed Rule
Changes Relating to Trading Pauses Due to Extraordinary Market Volatility, 75 Fed. Reg.
34,189.
204. Order Approving, on a Pilot Basis, the National Market System Plan to Address
Extraordinary Market Volatility, Exchange Act Release No. 67,091, 77 Fed. Reg. 33,498, 33,499,
33,501 n.36 (May 31, 2012).
205. See NYSE, DESIGNATED MARKET MAKERS (2014), https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/
nyse/markets/nyse/designated_market_makers.pdf [http://perma.cc/5346-RB9K].
206. KHALDOUN KHASHANAH, IONUT FLORESCU & STEVE YANG, IRRC INST., ON THE
IMPACT AND FUTURE OF HFT 14–17 (2014), http://irrcinstitute.org/pdf/HFT-Academic-WhitePaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/25DN-JPEB].
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strong paper obligations have proved insufficient in the past to
motivate market makers to continue supplying liquidity during
207
periods of extreme volatility. Commentators have also noted
problems with strengthening such affirmative obligations,
emphasizing that any system that requires liquidity providers to take
heavy losses during periods of extreme adverse selection must
compensate them for doing so at other times. At least two other
problems result: first, determining the value of that compensation is
extremely difficult, and second, during times of crisis these designated
208
liquidity providers will be the prime targets of informed traders.
Thus, we are skeptical about such proposals, especially given our
conclusion that the consequences of episodic volatility in terms of
209
wealth transfer and efficiency are not substantial.
C. Dark Pools
We examined two practices associated with an investment bank
playing the dual roles of a broker for customers’ orders and as an
operator of a dark pool. The first potential problem concerns brokers
directing customer orders to their own dark pools even when the
customer receives inferior execution there. The second concerns
brokers ignoring client instructions to direct an order to a specific
venue and instead routing it to the broker’s own dark pool.
A series of regulatory proposals that seek to rein in the growth of
dark-pool volume generally could affect these two practices, but with
the added and potentially undesirable effects of affecting access to
dark-pool trading in general. These proposals include: eliminating
retail investors’ access to dark pools and reserving them solely for
210
institutional investors;
requiring that dark pools offer price

207. See Jones, supra note 98, at 13–11, 38 (“While some observers suggested greater
obligations for market-makers, experience in other rapid downdrafts, including the stock
market crash of October 1987, when Nasdaq market-makers and others refused to answer their
phones or provide market-making activity, indicates that market-makers will almost always
choose to withdraw from the market in the face of such extreme volatility.”); see also Ian
Domowitz, Take Heed The Lessons From The 1962 Flash Crash, INFORMATIONWEEK:
WALLSTREET & TECH. (June 21, 2010, 5:15 PM), http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/exchanges/
take-heed-the-lessons-from-the-1962-flash-crash/a/d-id/1263651? [http://perma.cc/P23Q-56JT]
(discussing liquidity problems during a prior flash crash).
208. See Angel et al., supra note 29, at 33.
209. See supra Parts V.D.3, V.D.4.
210. See Philip Stafford, HK Plans Retail Investor Dark Pool Ban, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2014,
11:53 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/32ab7298-9fba-11e3-94f3-00144feab7de.html#axzz3I1I
B1vhn [http://perma.cc/D4AX-CS3W].
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improvement before an order can be routed to one; and caps for the
212
volume that can transact on dark venues. All of these proposals
seem insufficiently targeted, however, if the problems with dark pools
are solely the potential conflicts of interest noted above, rather than
more fundamental features.
More targeted and less intrusive would be a reform proposal
focused on disclosure, designed to assist customers in determining
whether their orders are being routed to venues offering best
execution and whether order-routing directions are being ignored.
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) has recently
taken steps in the direction of greater disclosure, requesting comment
213
on several new proposed rules. The most relevant proposal would
require dark pools to provide FINRA with more extensive orderbook information than they currently provide to the Order Audit
214
Trail System (OATS). OATS is an order-tracking system designed
215
to assist FINRA’s surveillance activities. Also, brokers could be
required to disclose what percentage of orders routed to their venue
were executed there, at what price, and what instructions, if any, were
associated with those orders. Economist James Angel, for example,
has called for greater disclosure by brokers, suggesting that
“brokerage firms themselves . . . disclose execution quality directly to
216
their customers.”

211. See Nicole Bullock, Financial Regulators Probe Dark Pools, FIN. TIMES (Sep. 16, 2014,
12:07 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/50428000-220d-11e4-9d4a-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3F
U6kj2LE [http://perma.cc/EM92-86BS].
212. See Philip Stafford & Alex Baker, Europe Deal Will Cap ‘Dark Pools’ Trading, FIN.
TIMES (Nov. 21, 2013, 5:26 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ac3ce0f8-52ce-11e3-8586-00144
feabdc0.html#axzz3CAa8BKBz [http://perma.cc/K4LB-DXXS].
213. Update: FINRA Board of Governors Meeting, FINRA (Sept. 19, 2014), https://www.
finra.org/Industry/Regulation/Guidance/CommunicationstoFirms/P600807 [http://perma.cc/JN
99-HVY8]; see Sarah N. Lynch, Wall Street Regulator Unveils Proposals for Dark Pools, Bond
Markets, REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2014, 3:21 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/19/usfinancial-regulations-finrarules-idUSKBN0HE25G20140919 [http://perma.cc/WLF9-2Q8E].
214. Update: FINRA Board of Governors Meeting, supra note 213 (“The Board authorized
the publication of a Regulatory Notice requesting comment on a proposal to require alternative
trading systems (ATSs) to provide FINRA with order book information that is not currently
reported by the ATS to the Order Audit Trail System (OATS), with such information to be
reported to FINRA using existing OATS interfaces.”).
215. See generally ORDER AUDIT TRAIL SYSTEM (OATS) OATS BASICS, FINRA, http://
www.finra.org/sites/default/files/AppSupportDoc/p016184.pptx [http://perma.cc/TB65-TYPP].
216. Role of Regulation Hearings, supra note 13, at 55 (statement of James J. Angel,
Associate Professor, Georgetown University McDonough School of Business). Several other
commentators have also called for greater disclosure by dark pools. See, e.g., id. at 33 (statement
of David Lauer, President and Managing Partner, KOR Group LLC) (urging that the SEC

FOX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

11/2/2015 1:17 PM

THE NEW STOCK MARKET

275

Certainly, more could be done to strengthen the stock market’s
mandatory disclosure regime. Currently, brokers are not required to
disclose to customers on their transaction confirmation slips the
217
venue in which an order was executed. The cost of requiring
disclosure of execution venue should not be taxing, as records of
where execution occurred must already be retained. Such disclosures
would provide customers with the ability to check whether their
requests were being followed.
Proposals based on disclosure, however, share at least two
vulnerabilities. First, if brokers are submitting inaccurate disclosures,
then the SEC or private litigants must feasibly be able to reveal such
conduct. Second, disclosure to customers will only be effective if
customers are in fact examining and acting on those disclosures,
which may not be the case. In an effort to mitigate this problem, the
SEC could conduct periodic audits to verify whether routing was
being accurately completed.
D. Payments to Brokers in Connection With Customer Orders
The last two controversial practices we considered were makertaker/taker-maker fees and payment for order flow. Each raises
principal-agent problems between traders and their brokers.
With regard to maker-taker and taker-maker fees, we saw that
with different venues providing different rebates and charging
different fees—something we observe in the real world—if brokerage
commissions do not vary depending on the venue to which an order is
sent, which again in the real world they do not, the broker has an
incentive to send nonmarketable limit orders to the venue with the
highest rebate and marketable orders to the venue with the lowest
218
fee. In each case, the venue to which the order is sent will probably
not provide best execution, a proposition for which there is, as we
have seen, some empirical evidence. If customers were perfect
monitors of their brokers, this incentive might not matter, but they

update Rules 605 and 606 to increase ATS reporting); id. at 23 (statement of Tom Wittman,
Executive Vice President and Global Head of Equities, NASDAQ OMX) (recommending that
brokerage firms should disclose execution quality directly to customers).
217. Brokers do have limited disclosure requirements under Regulation NMS. Rule 605
requires trading venues to provide monthly reports with various measures of execution quality,
and Rule 606 requires broker-dealers that route customer orders to provide quarterly reports
that identify at an aggregate level the venues where client orders are executed. See 17 C.F.R.
§§ 242.605–242.606 (2015).
218. See supra Part V.F.2.
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are not perfect monitors, especially with respect to limit orders. This
leads us to the conclusion that rebates should be passed directly
through to customers and fees charged to them, each independent of
whatever commission the broker chooses to charge. Such a reform
would not guarantee best execution, but it would eliminate an
incentive for poor execution.
With regard to payment for order flow, if the market for
internalization services and for brokerage services are both
sufficiently competitive, internalization with payment for order flow
promises retail market order traders as low an effective cost of
trading, when brokerage commissions are counted as part of the
calculation, as they are going to be able to get.
If one or both of the markets is not fully competitive, however,
the practice leads to these traders having higher effective costs of
trading than could be achieved by some other arrangement.
Remember that we are looking at a situation in which brokers have
the ability to segregate out retail order flow, which is uninformed, and
match buyers and sellers without the adverse-selection concerns that
generate much of the spread on exchanges. So the cost of execution
should be very low. Indeed, it is even possible that these traders
would be better off if all their trades would be sent to the exchanges,
because now the execution of retail market orders execute at prices
only slightly better than the NBB or NBO on exchanges that are
deprived of internalized order flow. If they had this additional
uninformed order flow, the NBB and NBO would be lower.
The key question is whether brokers pass on to customers the
substantial payments they receive for order flow in the form of lower
commissions given that internalizers only offer nominal price
improvement. We do not know the answer to this question, and it is
certainly possible that it happens. Still, passing through the payments
would solve the problem, if it were a problem. Such a reform should
also not be very costly. In essence, this appears to be a situation in
which the cure is sufficiently cheap that “if it might be broke, fix it.”
CONCLUSION
Over the last two decades, the stock market has been completely
transformed. Driven by regulatory change and the informationtechnology revolution, the structure of the market, the behavior of its
participants, and the character of liquidity provision have all
undergone dramatic and highly controversial changes. This Article
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provides a comprehensive framework for understanding the new
stock market and the social impact of the activities occurring within it.
We demonstrate the utility of this framework by applying it to eight
of the new market’s most controversial practices. These practices—
which include activities of high-frequency traders such as electronic
front running, the behavior of dark-pool operators, and payments by
trading venues to brokers in return for sending their customer
orders—may seem completely unrelated to each other, but we show
that they can all be understood through just three basic mechanisms:
adverse selection, the principal-agent problem, and a multivenue
trading system.
We come to a number of conclusions concerning the proposals
for reform. We agree, for example, with recommendations that
brokers should be required to pass through maker-taker fees and
payment for order flow to their customers. We disagree, for example,
with proposals that HFTs must keep their quotes in force for some
minimum amount of time and proposals aimed at generally
discouraging, or even banning, trading on dark pools. These are bad
ideas that seem to be based on a misunderstanding of how the market
really works or of the actual social impact of a given practice. Yet
other proposed reforms involve a trade-off in which an improvement
in terms of one worthwhile social goal can only come at a sacrifice of
another such goal. In these cases, it may not be obvious whether a
reform is, or is not, desirable, but our framework allows for a better
understanding of the trade-off involved, makes for a more informed
choice, and may point to where further empirical research would be
useful. We find this to be the case with, for example, proposals to
briefly delay providing HFTs with information concerning new
transactions and quotation changes, so HFTs have no advantages
over other traders.
In many ways, this Article is just a beginning. As the new stock
market continues to evolve, issues arising out of it will not be in short
supply. For example questions about whether the minimum stockprice differential (“tick size”) should be larger than the current one
cent and accusations that HFTs are sending in and cancelling quotes
at a high rate of speed simply to clog the system are each issues that
have been recently getting increasing attention. Surely many other
issues will soon be coming at us from over the horizon. Thus, the
framework developed here should have continued utility for some
time to come.

